Message-ID: <002f01c12743$52700650$3a8314d1@nwlink.com> Reply-To: "Conan Callen" From: "Conan Callen" To: References: <3B7C7C69.E7B84C68@earthlink.net> <20010817001226.J18183@vnl.com> Subject: Re: [Fwd: Partial TOC for Comment] Date: Fri, 17 Aug 2001 10:37:44 -0700 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Sender: owner-selinux@tycho.nsa.gov List-Id: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov > I don't expect SELinux will protect against all possible threats ... A chapter on SELinux scope would be helpful here. Listing additional references, tools & techniques that can be used along with SELinux to help find and plug the holes. Also a scenarios section would be nice too. For instance "Building Firewalls" has a whole chapter on different configurations. I want to set up two configurations, a secured server running http & smtp, and a dual homed firewall. The kinds of questions in my mind are "is there a better way that I could be doing this?", "am I setting this up correctly?, did I miss something ...?". For instance if it was just as secure to stick a second nic into the server and make it the gateway as well, then I could spend more effort on the one machine. ----- Original Message ----- From: "Dale Amon" To: "John Scroggins" Cc: Sent: Thursday, August 16, 2001 4:12 PM Subject: Re: [Fwd: Partial TOC for Comment] > > On Thu, Aug 16, 2001 at 07:07:37PM -0700, John Scroggins wrote: > > Please give me your feedback/critique on the TOC, and if you can think > > of additional subject headings (I do have more, but I want to see if > > this is moving in the right directiom..) > > > > I'd suggest a spell checker :-) > > Presumably the first sections will be a discussion of the why and > of the threat model and how SELinux secures you against those > classes of threats. > > My personal feeling is that this sort of discussion throughout > will be important. I don't expect SELinux will protect against > all possible threats and it would be bad for someone new to > computer security to read a book, install it, and start > bragging. > > I'd say that a good section should be set aside to interpreting > log information. Having a "secure" system does you no good if > you just let the kiddies and the black hats tinker undisturbed. > Given peace and quiet and enough time, I'm sure *anyone* can > break into *anything*. > > I find the idea of real time revokation interesting, because if > you see signs of an attack in progress, you can pull the rug > right out from under it... but again, only if you *realize* it > is an attack. > > Some of these issues become much more complex in a public system > than in a closed system. In a closed and controlled environment > almost anything out of the ordinary is suspicious; and innocent > triggering is fairly easy to spot. > > In summary, I think you need to tell not only how to set it up > and configure it and what the theory is behind it, but also > how to use it. > > > > > -- > You have received this message because you are subscribed to the selinux list. > If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with > the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message. > -- You have received this message because you are subscribed to the selinux list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.