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Thu, 17 Jul 2025 03:25:42 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: <007654f3-e26b-43b1-bc81-40ba25c9d787@suse.com> Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2025 12:25:30 +0200 MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 13/17] xen/riscv: Implement p2m_entry_from_mfn() and support PBMT configuration To: Oleksii Kurochko Cc: Alistair Francis , Bob Eshleman , Connor Davis , Andrew Cooper , Anthony PERARD , Michal Orzel , Julien Grall , =?UTF-8?Q?Roger_Pau_Monn=C3=A9?= , Stefano Stabellini , xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org References: <994ab3dd6822c4cd02a6a576041da115abeff6ed.1749555949.git.oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com> <640178f8-a189-4f84-abff-0ef87ba566a5@gmail.com> <0265e61a-ad08-4b6b-a87d-dba304f6d27d@suse.com> <15c9cb8e-8452-4dc3-933a-5713fc86a12a@suse.com> <958ae1b0-d139-41e8-b965-43ce640569c5@gmail.com> Content-Language: en-US From: Jan Beulich Autocrypt: addr=jbeulich@suse.com; keydata= xsDiBFk3nEQRBADAEaSw6zC/EJkiwGPXbWtPxl2xCdSoeepS07jW8UgcHNurfHvUzogEq5xk hu507c3BarVjyWCJOylMNR98Yd8VqD9UfmX0Hb8/BrA+Hl6/DB/eqGptrf4BSRwcZQM32aZK 7Pj2XbGWIUrZrd70x1eAP9QE3P79Y2oLrsCgbZJfEwCgvz9JjGmQqQkRiTVzlZVCJYcyGGsD /0tbFCzD2h20ahe8rC1gbb3K3qk+LpBtvjBu1RY9drYk0NymiGbJWZgab6t1jM7sk2vuf0Py O9Hf9XBmK0uE9IgMaiCpc32XV9oASz6UJebwkX+zF2jG5I1BfnO9g7KlotcA/v5ClMjgo6Gl MDY4HxoSRu3i1cqqSDtVlt+AOVBJBACrZcnHAUSuCXBPy0jOlBhxPqRWv6ND4c9PH1xjQ3NP nxJuMBS8rnNg22uyfAgmBKNLpLgAGVRMZGaGoJObGf72s6TeIqKJo/LtggAS9qAUiuKVnygo 3wjfkS9A3DRO+SpU7JqWdsveeIQyeyEJ/8PTowmSQLakF+3fote9ybzd880fSmFuIEJldWxp Y2ggPGpiZXVsaWNoQHN1c2UuY29tPsJgBBMRAgAgBQJZN5xEAhsDBgsJCAcDAgQVAggDBBYC AwECHgECF4AACgkQoDSui/t3IH4J+wCfQ5jHdEjCRHj23O/5ttg9r9OIruwAn3103WUITZee e7Sbg12UgcQ5lv7SzsFNBFk3nEQQCACCuTjCjFOUdi5Nm244F+78kLghRcin/awv+IrTcIWF hUpSs1Y91iQQ7KItirz5uwCPlwejSJDQJLIS+QtJHaXDXeV6NI0Uef1hP20+y8qydDiVkv6l IreXjTb7DvksRgJNvCkWtYnlS3mYvQ9NzS9PhyALWbXnH6sIJd2O9lKS1Mrfq+y0IXCP10eS FFGg+Av3IQeFatkJAyju0PPthyTqxSI4lZYuJVPknzgaeuJv/2NccrPvmeDg6Coe7ZIeQ8Yj t0ARxu2xytAkkLCel1Lz1WLmwLstV30g80nkgZf/wr+/BXJW/oIvRlonUkxv+IbBM3dX2OV8 AmRv1ySWPTP7AAMFB/9PQK/VtlNUJvg8GXj9ootzrteGfVZVVT4XBJkfwBcpC/XcPzldjv+3 HYudvpdNK3lLujXeA5fLOH+Z/G9WBc5pFVSMocI71I8bT8lIAzreg0WvkWg5V2WZsUMlnDL9 mpwIGFhlbM3gfDMs7MPMu8YQRFVdUvtSpaAs8OFfGQ0ia3LGZcjA6Ik2+xcqscEJzNH+qh8V m5jjp28yZgaqTaRbg3M/+MTbMpicpZuqF4rnB0AQD12/3BNWDR6bmh+EkYSMcEIpQmBM51qM EKYTQGybRCjpnKHGOxG0rfFY1085mBDZCH5Kx0cl0HVJuQKC+dV2ZY5AqjcKwAxpE75MLFkr wkkEGBECAAkFAlk3nEQCGwwACgkQoDSui/t3IH7nnwCfcJWUDUFKdCsBH/E5d+0ZnMQi+G0A nAuWpQkjM1ASeQwSHEeAWPgskBQL In-Reply-To: <958ae1b0-d139-41e8-b965-43ce640569c5@gmail.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit On 17.07.2025 10:56, Oleksii Kurochko wrote: > On 7/16/25 6:18 PM, Jan Beulich wrote: >> On 16.07.2025 18:07, Oleksii Kurochko wrote: >>> On 7/16/25 1:31 PM, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>> On 15.07.2025 16:47, Oleksii Kurochko wrote: >>>>> On 7/1/25 5:08 PM, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>>>> On 10.06.2025 15:05, Oleksii Kurochko wrote: >>>>>>> --- a/xen/arch/riscv/p2m.c >>>>>>> +++ b/xen/arch/riscv/p2m.c >>>>>>> @@ -345,6 +345,26 @@ static pte_t *p2m_get_root_pointer(struct p2m_domain *p2m, gfn_t gfn) >>>>>>> return __map_domain_page(p2m->root + root_table_indx); >>>>>>> } >>>>>>> >>>>>>> +static int p2m_type_radix_set(struct p2m_domain *p2m, pte_t pte, p2m_type_t t) >>>>>> See comments on the earlier patch regarding naming. >>>>>> >>>>>>> +{ >>>>>>> + int rc; >>>>>>> + gfn_t gfn = mfn_to_gfn(p2m->domain, mfn_from_pte(pte)); >>>>>> How does this work, when you record GFNs only for Xenheap pages? >>> >>>>> I think I don't understand what is an issue. Could you please provide >>>>> some extra details? >>>> Counter question: The mfn_to_gfn() you currently have is only a stub. It only >>>> works for 1:1 mapped domains. Can you show me the eventual final implementation >>>> of the function, making it possible to use it here? >>> At the moment, I planned to support only 1:1 mapped domains, so it is final >>> implementation. >> Isn't that on overly severe limitation? > > I wouldn't say that it's a severe limitation, as it's just a matter of how > |mfn_to_gfn()| is implemented. When non-1:1 mapped domains are supported, > |mfn_to_gfn()| can be implemented differently, while the code where it’s called > will likely remain unchanged. > > What I meant in my reply is that, for the current state and current limitations, > this is the final implementation of|mfn_to_gfn()|. But that doesn't mean I don't > see the value in, or the need for, non-1:1 mapped domains—it's just that this > limitation simplifies development at the current stage of the RISC-V port. Simplification is fine in some cases, but not supporting the "normal" way of domain construction looks like a pretty odd restriction. I'm also curious how you envision to implement mfn_to_gfn() then, suitable for generic use like the one here. Imo, current limitation or not, you simply want to avoid use of that function outside of the special gnttab case. >>>>>> In this context (not sure if I asked before): With this use of a radix tree, >>>>>> how do you intend to bound the amount of memory that a domain can use, by >>>>>> making Xen insert very many entries? >>>>> I didn’t think about that. I assumed it would be enough to set the amount of >>>>> memory a guest domain can use by specifying|xen,domain-p2m-mem-mb| in the DTS, >>>>> or using some predefined value if|xen,domain-p2m-mem-mb| isn’t explicitly set. >>>> Which would require these allocations to come from that pool. >>> Yes, and it is true only for non-hardware domains with the current implementation. >> ??? > > I meant that pool is used now only for non-hardware domains at the moment. And how does this matter here? The memory required for the radix tree doesn't come from that pool anyway. >>>>> Also, it seems this would just lead to the issue you mentioned earlier: when >>>>> the memory runs out,|domain_crash()| will be called or PTE will be zapped. >>>> Or one domain exhausting memory would cause another domain to fail. A domain >>>> impacting just itself may be tolerable. But a domain affecting other domains >>>> isn't. >>> But it seems like this issue could happen in any implementation. It won't happen only >>> if we will have only pre-populated pool for any domain type (hardware, control, guest >>> domain) without ability to extend them or allocate extra pages from domheap in runtime. >>> Otherwise, if extra pages allocation is allowed then we can't really do something >>> with this issue. >> But that's why I brought this up: You simply have to. Or, as indicated, the >> moment you mark Xen security-supported on RISC-V, there will be an XSA needed. > > Why it isn't XSA for other architectures? At least, Arm then should have such > XSA. Does Arm use a radix tree for storing types? It uses one for mem-access, but it's not clear to me whether that's actually a supported feature. > I don't understand why x86 won't have the same issue. Memory is the limited > and shared resource, so if one of the domain will use to much memory then it could > happen that other domains won't have enough memory for its purpose... The question is whether allocations are bounded. With this use of a radix tree, you give domains a way to have Xen allocate pretty much arbitrary amounts of memory to populate that tree. That unbounded-ness is the problem, not memory allocations in general. Jan