From: Tushar Sugandhi Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 5/6] IMA: add hook to measure critical data from kernel components Date: Fri, 11 Sep 2020 10:38:30 -0700 Message-ID: <01f5ea67-447e-c1c2-9c47-49fd3f6c16ec@linux.microsoft.com> References: <20200828015704.6629-1-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> <20200828015704.6629-6-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> <6c80bdad49c72fa58b5a9fb7ce2d20c8cabe1324.camel@linux.ibm.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: <6c80bdad49c72fa58b5a9fb7ce2d20c8cabe1324.camel@linux.ibm.com> Content-Language: en-US Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org To: Mimi Zohar , stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, gmazyland@gmail.com Cc: tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, sashal@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com List-Id: dm-devel.ids On 2020-08-31 11:23 a.m., Mimi Zohar wrote: >> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c >> index 52cbbc1f7ea2..a889bf40cb7e 100644 >> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c >> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c >> @@ -869,6 +869,30 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) >> fdput(f); >> } >> >> +/** >> + * ima_measure_critical_data - measure critical data >> + * @event_name: name for the given data >> + * @event_data_source: name of the event data source >> + * @buf: pointer to buffer containing data to measure >> + * @buf_len: length of buffer(in bytes) >> + * @measure_buf_hash: if set to true - will measure hash of the buf, >> + * instead of buf >> + * >> + * Buffers can only be measured, not appraised. >> + */ >> +int ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name, >> + const char *event_data_source, >> + const void *buf, int buf_len, >> + bool measure_buf_hash) >> +{ >> + if (!event_name || !event_data_source || !buf || !buf_len) >> + return -EINVAL; >> + >> + return process_buffer_measurement(NULL, buf, buf_len, event_name, >> + CRITICAL_DATA, 0, event_data_source, >> + measure_buf_hash); > > This is exactly what I'm concerned about. Failure to measure data may > be audited, but should never fail. > > Mimi > As I responded in patch 2, I can ignore the result of process_buffer_measurement() in ima_measure_critical_data(), and make ima_measure_critical_data() return type as "void". But that’s the only place where the results of p_b_m() are being used. So I might as well just revert the return type of p_b_m() to the original "void". >> +} >