Return-Path: Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=pass (mailfrom) smtp.mailfrom=linux.ibm.com (client-ip=148.163.156.1; helo=mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com; envelope-from=jrey@linux.ibm.com; receiver=) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.ibm.com Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com [148.163.156.1]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 440HKK3qZ7zDqL5 for ; Thu, 14 Feb 2019 11:27:33 +1100 (AEDT) Received: from pps.filterd (m0098393.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x1E0JNMn125974 for ; Wed, 13 Feb 2019 19:27:31 -0500 Received: from e36.co.us.ibm.com (e36.co.us.ibm.com [32.97.110.154]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2qmt758vtp-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Wed, 13 Feb 2019 19:27:30 -0500 Received: from localhost by e36.co.us.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Thu, 14 Feb 2019 00:27:27 -0000 Received: from b03ledav005.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03ledav005.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.236]) by b03cxnp07028.gho.boulder.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x1E0RQVU19726370 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Thu, 14 Feb 2019 00:27:26 GMT Received: from b03ledav005.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3C8DFBE051; Thu, 14 Feb 2019 00:27:26 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b03ledav005.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0A72ABE04F; Thu, 14 Feb 2019 00:27:25 +0000 (GMT) Received: from ltc.linux.ibm.com (unknown [9.16.170.189]) by b03ledav005.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Thu, 14 Feb 2019 00:27:25 +0000 (GMT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2019 18:34:14 -0600 From: Joseph Reynolds To: Andrew Jeffery Cc: Nancy Yuen , OpenBMC Maillist , Brad Bishop , openbmc Subject: Re: Secure boot for BMC In-Reply-To: <1550013215.2866613.1656755904.44211550@webmail.messagingengine.com> References: <20190205141403.y2yno3nmxvwgd6ex@thinkpad> <1549861046.1162750.1655235472.36317B95@webmail.messagingengine.com> <1550013215.2866613.1656755904.44211550@webmail.messagingengine.com> X-Sender: jrey@linux.ibm.com User-Agent: Roundcube Webmail/1.0.1 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19021400-0020-0000-0000-00000EBB771B X-IBM-SpamModules-Scores: X-IBM-SpamModules-Versions: BY=3.00010591; HX=3.00000242; KW=3.00000007; PH=3.00000004; SC=3.00000279; SDB=6.01160684; UDB=6.00605807; IPR=6.00941239; MB=3.00025570; MTD=3.00000008; XFM=3.00000015; UTC=2019-02-14 00:27:29 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19021400-0021-0000-0000-000064CA37B6 Message-Id: <02642911831c76d37123735a2964984f@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:, , definitions=2019-02-13_14:, , signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=608 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1810050000 definitions=main-1902140001 X-BeenThere: openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Development list for OpenBMC List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2019 00:27:33 -0000 On 2019-02-12 17:13, Andrew Jeffery wrote: > On Tue, 12 Feb 2019, at 11:00, Nancy Yuen wrote: >> We are working on secure boot, but we have a requirement for a Google >> HW >> root of trust so I'm not sure if that fits in with these discussions. > > I think it would help to have some idea of Google's requirements so the > project > can accommodate them where we can, if you can reveal any details. It > may also > help inform others (me?) on strategies to secure firmware. The OpenBMC security working group has discussed various "root of trust" ideas. The way I understand it, OpenBMC community members are looking into different solutions including "Secure Boot" and "Trusted Platform Module" (TPM) solutions, including Google's OpenTitan chip. See the meeting minutes for details: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1b7x9BaxsfcukQDqbvZsU2ehMq4xoJRQvLxxsDUWmAOI My understanding of the "Secure Boot" concept is that some chip validates the boot loader's digital signature after loading it and before jumping into it. Then the boot loader would validate the code it loads before jumping into it. Etc. A validation failure could either (a) cause the BMC to fail to boot, or (b) boot the BMC in failsafe mode where it could not write to its flash or talk to its host. OpenBMC may also need some way to talk to the chip. My understanding of TPMs is much more limited. So we are waiting for proposals. - Joseph > Andrew