From: Alexey Budankov Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2020 20:30:54 +0300 Message-ID: <05297eff-8e14-ccdf-55a4-870c64516de8@linux.intel.com> References: <0548c832-7f4b-dc4c-8883-3f2b6d351a08@linux.intel.com> <9b77124b-675d-5ac7-3741-edec575bd425@linux.intel.com> <64cab472-806e-38c4-fb26-0ffbee485367@tycho.nsa.gov> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: <64cab472-806e-38c4-fb26-0ffbee485367@tycho.nsa.gov> Content-Language: en-US Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org To: Stephen Smalley , Peter Zijlstra , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Ingo Molnar , "jani.nikula@linux.intel.com" , "joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com" , "rodrigo.vivi@intel.com" , "benh@kernel.crashing.org" , Paul Mackerras , Michael Ellerman , "james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com" , Serge Hallyn , James Morris , Will Deacon , Mark Rutland , Robert Richter , Alexei Starovoitov Cc: Jiri Olsa , Andi Kleen , Stephane Eranian , Igor Lubashev , Alexander Shishkin , Namhyung Kim , Song Liu , Lionel Landwerlin , Thomas Gleixner , linux-kernel , "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" , "selinux@vger.kernel.org" , "intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org" , "linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" , "linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org List-Id: linux-perf-users.vger.kernel.org On 21.01.2020 17:43, Stephen Smalley wrote: > On 1/20/20 6:23 AM, Alexey Budankov wrote: >> >> Introduce CAP_PERFMON capability designed to secure system performance >> monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_PERFMON would assist >> CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for perf_events, i915_perf >> and other performance monitoring and observability subsystems. >> >> CAP_PERFMON intends to harden system security and integrity during system >> performance monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack >> surface that is available to a CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged process [1]. >> Providing access to system performance monitoring and observability >> operations under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of >> CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and >> makes operation more secure. >> >> CAP_PERFMON intends to take over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to >> system performance monitoring and observability operations and balance >> amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials following the recommendations in the >> capabilities man page [1] for CAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is >> overloaded; see Notes to kernel developers, below." >> >> Although the software running under CAP_PERFMON can not ensure avoidance >> of related hardware issues, the software can still mitigate these issues >> following the official embargoed hardware issues mitigation procedure [2]. >> The bugs in the software itself could be fixed following the standard >> kernel development process [3] to maintain and harden security of system >> performance monitoring and observability operations. >> >> [1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html >> [2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.html >> [3] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/security-bugs.html >> >> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov >> --- >>   include/linux/capability.h          | 12 ++++++++++++ >>   include/uapi/linux/capability.h     |  8 +++++++- >>   security/selinux/include/classmap.h |  4 ++-- >>   3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h >> index ecce0f43c73a..8784969d91e1 100644 >> --- a/include/linux/capability.h >> +++ b/include/linux/capability.h >> @@ -251,6 +251,18 @@ extern bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct >>   extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap); >>   extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); >>   extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns); >> +static inline bool perfmon_capable(void) >> +{ >> +    struct user_namespace *ns = &init_user_ns; >> + >> +    if (ns_capable_noaudit(ns, CAP_PERFMON)) >> +        return ns_capable(ns, CAP_PERFMON); >> + >> +    if (ns_capable_noaudit(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) >> +        return ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); >> + >> +    return false; >> +} > > Why _noaudit()?  Normally only used when a permission failure is non-fatal to the operation.  Otherwise, we want the audit message. Some of ideas from v4 review. Well, on the second sight, it defenitly should be logged for CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Probably it is not so fatal for CAP_PERFMON, but personally I would unconditionally log it for CAP_PERFMON as well. Good catch, thank you. ~Alexey