From: "plaisthos (Code Review)" Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2025 08:14:23 +0000 In-Reply-To: References: Reply-To: arne-openvpn@...1227..., openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, frank@...2641... Message-ID: <0ce8cd0299fe59653b623aa0f39ebf25341ff1eb-EmailReplacePatchSet-HTML@...2715...> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Disposition: inline Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="aUJaO1JcKRk="; charset=UTF-8 Subject: [Openvpn-devel] [M] Change in openvpn[master]: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: flichtenheld Cc: openvpn-devel --aUJaO1JcKRk= Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Attention is currently required from: flichtenheld. Hello flichtenheld,=20 I'd like you to reexamine a change. Please visit http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067?usp=3Demail to look at the new patch set (#3). Change subject: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie = checks ...................................................................... Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks This fixes that control packets on a floating client can trigger creating a new session in special circumstances: To trigger this circumstance a connection needs to - starts on IP A - successfully floats to IP B by data packet - then has a control packet from IP A before any data packet can trigger the float back to IP A and all of this needs to happen in the 60s time that hmac cookie is valid in the default configuration. In this scenario we would trigger a new connection as the HMAC session id would be valid. This patch adds checking also of the message-id and acked ids to discern packet from the initial three-way handshake where these ids 0 or 1 from any later packet. This will now trigger (at verb 4 or higher) a messaged like: Packet (P_ACK_V1) with invalid or missing SID instead. Reported-By: Walter Doekes Tested-By: Walter Doekes Change-Id: I6752dcd5aff3e5cea2b439366479e86751a1c403 Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe --- M src/openvpn/mudp.c M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h M tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c 4 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) git pull ssh://gerrit.openvpn.net:29418/openvpn refs/changes/67/1067/3 diff --git a/src/openvpn/mudp.c b/src/openvpn/mudp.c index 93e65e0..9cd667c 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/mudp.c +++ b/src/openvpn/mudp.c @@ -63,7 +63,6 @@ msg(D_MULTI_DEBUG, "Reset packet from client, sending HMAC based reset= challenge"); } - /* Returns true if this packet should create a new session */ static bool do_pre_decrypt_check(struct multi_context *m, @@ -155,7 +154,8 @@ * need to contain the peer id */ struct gc_arena gc =3D gc_new(); - bool ret =3D check_session_id_hmac(state, from, hmac, handwindow); + bool pkt_is_ack =3D (verdict =3D=3D VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1); + bool ret =3D check_session_id_hmac(state, from, hmac, handwindow, = pkt_is_ack); const char *peer =3D print_link_socket_actual(&m->top.c2.from, &gc= ); uint8_t pkt_firstbyte =3D *BPTR( &m->top.c2.buf); @@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ msg(D_MULTI_DEBUG, "Valid packet (%s) with HMAC challenge from= peer (%s), " "accepting new connection.", packet_opcode_name(op), peer); } + gc_free(&gc); return ret; diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c index bfd405f..0bbc465 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c @@ -293,6 +293,7 @@ } } + /* * This function is similar to tls_pre_decrypt, except it is called * when we are in server mode and receive an initial incoming @@ -530,7 +531,8 @@ check_session_id_hmac(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state, const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, hmac_ctx_t *hmac, - int handwindow) + int handwindow, + bool pkt_is_ack) { if (!from) { @@ -545,6 +547,36 @@ return false; } + /* Check if the packet ID of the packet or ACKED packet is <=3D 1 */ + for (int i =3D 0; i < ack.len; i++) + { + /* This packet ACKs a packet that has a higher packet id than the + * ones expected in the three-way handshake, consider it as invalid + * for the session */ + if (ack.packet_id[i] > 1) + { + return false; + } + } + + if (!pkt_is_ack) + { + packet_id_type message_id; + /* Extract the packet ID from the packet */ + if (!reliable_ack_read_packet_id(&buf, &message_id)) + { + return false; + } + + /* similar check. Anything larger than 1 is not considered part of= the + * three-way handshake */ + if (message_id > 1) + { + return false; + } + } + + /* check adjacent timestamps too */ for (int offset =3D -2; offset <=3D 1; offset++) { diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h index 98a39d3..1b6bcc0 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h @@ -180,17 +180,24 @@ /** * Checks if a control packet has a correct HMAC server session id * + * This will also consider packets that have a packet id higher + * than 1 or ack packets higher than 1 to be invalid as they are + * not part of the initial three way handshake of OpenVPN and should + * not create a new connection. + * * @param state session information * @param from link_socket from the client * @param hmac the hmac context to use for the calculation * @param handwindow the quantisation of the current time + * @param pkt_is_ack the packet being checked is a P_ACK_V1 * @return the expected server session id */ bool check_session_id_hmac(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state, const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, hmac_ctx_t *hmac, - int handwindow); + int handwindow, + bool pkt_is_ack); /* * Write a control channel authentication record. diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn= /test_pkt.c index ebffabe..56ed842 100644 --- a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c +++ b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c @@ -170,6 +170,27 @@ 0x85, 0xdb, 0x53, 0x56, 0x23, 0xb0, 0x2e }; +/* no tls-auth, P_ACK_V1, acks 0,1, and 2 */ +const uint8_t client_ack_123_none_random_id[] =3D { + 0x28, + 0xae, 0xb9, 0xaf, 0xe1, 0xf0, 0x1d, 0x79, 0xc8, + 0x03, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, + 0xdd, 0x85, 0xdb, 0x53, 0x56, 0x23, 0xb0, 0x2e +}; + +/* no tls-auth, P_CONTROL_V1, acks 0, msg-id 2 */ +const uint8_t client_control_none_random_id[] =3D { + 0x20, + 0xae, 0xb9, 0xaf, 0xe1, 0xf0, 0x1d, 0x79, 0xc8, + 0x01, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x02 +}; + + struct tls_auth_standalone init_tas_auth(int key_direction) { @@ -439,7 +460,7 @@ assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_CONTROL_V1); /* This is a valid packet but containing a random id instead of an HMA= C id*/ - bool valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30); + bool valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30, fal= se); assert_false(valid); free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); @@ -470,7 +491,7 @@ verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf); assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1); - bool valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30); + bool valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30, tru= e); assert_true(valid); free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); @@ -479,6 +500,50 @@ hmac_ctx_free(hmac); } +static void +test_verify_hmac_none_out_of_range_ack(void **ut_state) +{ + hmac_ctx_t *hmac =3D session_id_hmac_init(); + + struct link_socket_actual from =3D { 0 }; + from.dest.addr.sa.sa_family =3D AF_INET; + + struct tls_auth_standalone tas =3D { 0 }; + struct tls_pre_decrypt_state state =3D { 0 }; + + struct buffer buf =3D alloc_buf(1024); + enum first_packet_verdict verdict; + + tas.tls_wrap.mode =3D TLS_WRAP_NONE; + + buf_reset_len(&buf); + buf_write(&buf, client_ack_123_none_random_id, sizeof(client_ack_123_n= one_random_id)); + + + verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf); + assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1); + + /* should fail because it acks 2 */ + bool valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30, tru= e); + assert_false(valid); + + /* Try test with the control with a too high message id now */ + buf_reset_len(&buf); + buf_write(&buf, client_control_none_random_id, sizeof(client_control_n= one_random_id)); + + verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf); + assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_CONTROL_V1); + + /* should fail because it has message id 2 */ + valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30, true); + assert_false(valid); + + free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); + free_buf(&buf); + hmac_ctx_cleanup(hmac); + hmac_ctx_free(hmac); +} + static hmac_ctx_t * init_static_hmac(void) { @@ -667,6 +732,7 @@ cmocka_unit_test(test_calc_session_id_hmac_static), cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hmac_none), cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hmac_tls_auth), + cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hmac_none_out_of_range_ack), cmocka_unit_test(test_generate_reset_packet_plain), cmocka_unit_test(test_generate_reset_packet_tls_auth), cmocka_unit_test(test_extract_control_message) -- To view, visit http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067?usp=3Demail To unsubscribe, or for help writing mail filters, visit http://gerrit.openv= pn.net/settings Gerrit-Project: openvpn Gerrit-Branch: master Gerrit-Change-Id: I6752dcd5aff3e5cea2b439366479e86751a1c403 Gerrit-Change-Number: 1067 Gerrit-PatchSet: 3 Gerrit-Owner: plaisthos Gerrit-Reviewer: flichtenheld Gerrit-CC: openvpn-devel Gerrit-Attention: flichtenheld Gerrit-MessageType: newpatchset --aUJaO1JcKRk= Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Attention is currently required from: flichtenheld.

plaisthos uploaded patch set #3 to this change.

<= a href=3D"http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067?usp=3Demail">View Chan= ge

Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks
This fixes that control packets on a floating client can trigger
cr= eating a new session in special circumstances:

To trigger this circu= mstance a connection needs to

- starts on IP A
- successfully flo= ats to IP B by data packet
- then has a control packet from IP A before = any
data packet can trigger the float back to IP A

and all of t= his needs to happen in the 60s time
that hmac cookie is valid in the def= ault
configuration.

In this scenario we would trigger a new conne= ction as the HMAC
session id would be valid.

This patch adds chec= king also of the message-id and acked ids to
discern packet from the ini= tial three-way handshake where these
ids 0 or 1 from any later packet.
This will now trigger (at verb 4 or higher) a messaged like:

= Packet (P_ACK_V1) with invalid or missing SID

instead.

Repo= rted-By: Walter Doekes <walter.openvpn@...2889...>
Tested-By: Walt= er Doekes <walter.openvpn@...2889...>

Change-Id: I6752dcd5aff3= e5cea2b439366479e86751a1c403
Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <arne@...2068...= 7...>
---
M src/openvpn/mudp.c
M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c
M src= /openvpn/ssl_pkt.h
M tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c
4 files chan= ged, 112 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

git pull ssh://gerrit.open=
vpn.net:29418/openvpn refs/changes/67/1067/3
diff --git a/src/openv=
pn/mudp.c b/src/openvpn/mudp.c
index 93e65e0..9cd667c 10064= 4
--- a/src/openvpn/mudp.c
+++ b/src/openvp= n/mudp.c
@@ -63,7 +63,6 @@
msg(D_MULTI= _DEBUG, "Reset packet from client, sending HMAC based reset challenge&= quot;);
}

-
/* Returns true if this packet sho= uld create a new session */
static bool
d= o_pre_decrypt_check(struct multi_context *m,
@@ -155,7 +154= ,8 @@
* need to contain the peer id */
= struct gc_arena gc =3D gc_new();
- bool ret =3D check_sess= ion_id_hmac(state, from, hmac, handwindow);
+ bool pkt_is_ack =3D (verdict =3D=3D VERDICT= _VALID_ACK_V1);
+ = bool ret =3D check_session_id_hmac(state, from, hmac, handwindow, pkt_i= s_ack);

const char *peer =3D pri= nt_link_socket_actual(&m->top.c2.from, &gc);
= uint8_t pkt_firstbyte =3D *BPTR( &m->top.c2.buf);
@@ -171,6 +171,7 @@
msg(D_MULTI_DEBUG, &qu= ot;Valid packet (%s) with HMAC challenge from peer (%s), "
<= span> "accepting new connection.", packet_opcode_= name(op), peer);
}
+
gc_free(&gc);<= br>
return ret;
diff --git = a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c
index bfd40= 5f..0bbc465 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c
@@ -293,6 +293,7 @@<= br> }
}

+
/*
* = This function is similar to tls_pre_decrypt, except it is called
= * when we are in server mode and receive an initial incoming=
@@ -530,7 +531,8 @@
check_session_id_hmac(struct= tls_pre_decrypt_state *state,
const= struct openvpn_sockaddr *from,
hmac= _ctx_t *hmac,
- = int handwindow)
+ int handwindow,
+ bool pkt_is_ack) {
if (!from)
{@@ -545,6 +547,36 @@
return false; }

+ /* Check if the packet ID of the packet or ACKED packet i= s <=3D 1 */
+ f= or (int i =3D 0; i < ack.len; i++)
+ {
+ /* This packet ACKs a packet that has a higher packet id than t= he
+ * ones e= xpected in the three-way handshake, consider it as invalid
+ * for the session */=
+ if (ack.packet_id[= i] > 1)
+ {=
+ return = false;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!pkt_is_ack)
+ {
+ packet_id_type message_id;
+ /* Extract the packet ID from the packet */

+ if (!reliable_= ack_read_packet_id(&buf, &message_id))
+ {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ = /* similar check. Anything larger than 1 is not considered part of the

+ * three-way h= andshake */
+ = if (message_id > 1)
+ = return false;
+ = }
+ }
+
+
/* check adjacent time= stamps too */
for (int offset =3D -2; offset <=3D 1= ; offset++)
{
diff --git a/src/openvpn= /ssl_pkt.h b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h
index 98a39d3..1b6bcc0 1= 00644
--- a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h
+++ b/src= /openvpn/ssl_pkt.h
@@ -180,17 +180,24 @@
/= **
* Checks if a control packet has a correct HMAC server= session id
*
+ * This will also consider packets that have a packet id higher=
+ * than 1 or ack pa= ckets higher than 1 to be invalid as they are
+ * not part of the initial three way handshake of= OpenVPN and should
+= * not create a new connection.
+ *
* @param state session information=
* @param from link_socket from the client
* @param hmac the hmac context to use for the calcula= tion
* @param handwindow the quantisation of the curre= nt time
+ * @param pk= t_is_ack the packet being checked is a P_ACK_V1
* @ret= urn the expected server session id
*/=
bool
check_session_id_hmac(struct tls_pre_decry= pt_state *state,
const struct openvp= n_sockaddr *from,
hmac_ctx_t *hmac,<= /span>
- = int handwindow);
+ = int handwindow,
+ bool pkt_is_ack);

/*
* Write a control channel authenticatio= n record.
diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c = b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c
index ebffabe..56ed84= 2 100644
--- a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c+++ b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c
@@ -170,6= +170,27 @@
0x85, 0xdb, 0x53, 0x56, 0x23, 0xb0, 0x2e
};

+/* no tls-auth, P_ACK_V1, acks 0,1, and 2 */
+const uint8_t client_ack_123_none= _random_id[] =3D {

+ = 0x28,
+ 0xae, 0= xb9, 0xaf, 0xe1, 0xf0, 0x1d, 0x79, 0xc8,
+ 0x03,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02,
+ 0xdd, 0x85, 0xdb, 0x53, 0x56, 0x23, = 0xb0, 0x2e
+};=
+
+/* no tls-auth, P_CONTROL_V1, acks 0, msg-id = 2 */
+const uint8_t c= lient_control_none_random_id[] =3D {
+ 0x20,
+ 0xae, 0xb9, 0xaf, 0xe1, 0xf0, 0x1d, 0x79, 0xc8,
+ 0x01,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x02
+};
+
+ struct tls_auth_standalone
init_tas_auth(int key_d= irection)
{
@@ -439,7 +460,7 @@
= assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_CONTROL_V1);
<= span>

/* This is a valid packet but containing a rand= om id instead of an HMAC id*/
- bool valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&state, &from.dest= , hmac, 30);
+ boo= l valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30, fal= se);
assert_false(valid);

= free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);
@@ -470,= 7 +491,7 @@
verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas,= &state, &from, &buf);
assert_int_equal(ve= rdict, VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1);

- bool valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&sta= te, &from.dest, hmac, 30);
+ bool valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&state, &from.d= est, hmac, 30, true);
assert_true(valid);

free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);@@ -479,6 +500,50 @@
hmac_ctx_free(hmac);
}

+static void
+test_verify_hmac_none_out_of_range_ack(void **ut_state)
+{

+ hmac_ctx_t *hmac =3D session_id_hmac_init();
+
+ struct link_socket_actual from =3D { = 0 };
+ from.dest.a= ddr.sa.sa_family =3D AF_INET;
+
+ struc= t tls_auth_standalone tas =3D { 0 };
+ struct tls_pre_decrypt_state state =3D { 0 };+
+ struct buffer buf =3D alloc_buf(1024);
+ enum first_packet_ve= rdict verdict;
+
+ tas.tls_wrap.mode = =3D TLS_WRAP_NONE;
+<= /span>
+ buf_reset_len(&a= mp;buf);
+ buf_wri= te(&buf, client_ack_123_none_random_id, sizeof(client_ack_123_none_rand= om_id));
+
= +
+ verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &a= mp;state, &from, &buf);
+ assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1);
= +
+ /* should fail because it acks 2 */+ bool valid =3D check_sess= ion_id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30, true);
+ assert_false(valid);
+

+ /* Try test with the control with a too high mes= sage id now */
+ b= uf_reset_len(&buf);
+ buf_write(&buf, client_control_none_random_id, sizeof(client_co= ntrol_none_random_id));
+
+ verdict =3D= tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf);+ assert_int_equal(verdict,= VERDICT_VALID_CONTROL_V1);
+
+ /* shou= ld fail because it has message id 2 */
+ valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&state, &fro= m.dest, hmac, 30, true);
+ assert_false(valid);
+
+ free_= tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);
+ free_buf(&buf);
+ hmac_ctx_cleanup(hmac);
+ hmac_ctx_free(hmac);
+}
+
static hmac_ctx_t *
init= _static_hmac(void)
{
@@ -667,6 +732,7 @@
cmocka_unit_test(test_calc_session_id_hmac_static),=
cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hmac_none), cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hmac_tls_auth),
+ cmocka_unit_test(test_ver= ify_hmac_none_out_of_range_ack),

cmocka_unit_test(= test_generate_reset_packet_plain),
cmocka_unit_tes= t(test_generate_reset_packet_tls_auth),
cmocka_uni= t_test(test_extract_control_message)

To= view, visit change 1067. To unsubscribe, or for help writing mail filters, vis= it settings.

Gerrit-Project: openvpn
Gerrit-Branch: master
Gerrit-Change-Id: I6752dcd5aff3e5cea2b43936647= 9e86751a1c403
Gerrit-Change-Number: 1067
Gerrit-PatchSet: 3
Gerrit-Owner: plaisthos <arne-openvpn@...1711...= 27...>
Gerrit-Reviewer: flichtenheld <frank@...2716...= 1...>
Gerrit-CC: openvpn-devel <openvpn-devel@...1484...= ts.sourceforge.net>
Gerrit-Attention: flichtenheld <frank@...2375...= 41...>
Gerrit-MessageType: newpatchset
--aUJaO1JcKRk=--