Return-Path: Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=pass (mailfrom) smtp.mailfrom=linux.ibm.com (client-ip=148.163.156.1; helo=mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com; envelope-from=jrey@linux.ibm.com; receiver=) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.ibm.com Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com [148.163.156.1]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 45SHB960jwzDqW4 for ; Tue, 18 Jun 2019 02:44:49 +1000 (AEST) Received: from pps.filterd (m0098394.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x5HGgLMw121841 for ; Mon, 17 Jun 2019 12:44:45 -0400 Received: from e14.ny.us.ibm.com (e14.ny.us.ibm.com [129.33.205.204]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2t6bmh8jfr-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Mon, 17 Jun 2019 12:44:45 -0400 Received: from localhost by e14.ny.us.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! 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Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Mon, 17 Jun 2019 17:44:40 +0100 Received: from b01ledav006.gho.pok.ibm.com (b01ledav006.gho.pok.ibm.com [9.57.199.111]) by b01cxnp22035.gho.pok.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x5HGidp624314360 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK) for ; Mon, 17 Jun 2019 16:44:39 GMT Received: from b01ledav006.gho.pok.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9446EAC05F for ; Mon, 17 Jun 2019 16:44:39 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b01ledav006.gho.pok.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 43680AC059 for ; Mon, 17 Jun 2019 16:44:39 +0000 (GMT) Received: from ltc.linux.ibm.com (unknown [9.16.170.189]) by b01ledav006.gho.pok.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP for ; Mon, 17 Jun 2019 16:44:39 +0000 (GMT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 11:46:10 -0500 From: Joseph Reynolds To: Openbmc Subject: Move away from default password X-Sender: jrey@linux.ibm.com User-Agent: Roundcube Webmail/1.0.1 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19061716-0052-0000-0000-000003D20D70 X-IBM-SpamModules-Scores: X-IBM-SpamModules-Versions: BY=3.00011279; HX=3.00000242; KW=3.00000007; PH=3.00000004; SC=3.00000286; SDB=6.01219338; UDB=6.00641356; IPR=6.01000480; MB=3.00027346; MTD=3.00000008; XFM=3.00000015; UTC=2019-06-17 16:44:41 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19061716-0053-0000-0000-0000615BAC25 Message-Id: <1164a9a82b2b59087059c59391e65d04@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:, , definitions=2019-06-17_07:, , signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1810050000 definitions=main-1906170148 X-BeenThere: openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Development list for OpenBMC List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 16:44:50 -0000 There is some interest in moving OpenBMC away from a default password. - email: https://lists.ozlabs.org/pipermail/openbmc/2019-June/016515.html (which references a RestrictionMode design: https://gerrit.openbmc-project.xyz/c/openbmc/docs/+/21195) Having a default password is a security risk. Note that changing to a different default password is not a good solution. For example, if a bad actor learns the default password from one device, that actor will likely know the password for many of them. I am exploring two options for OpenBMC, and want your feedback. 1. Unique password per BMC. In this approach, there is a way to change the factory default password. Example flow: assemble the BMC, test it, factory reset, generate unique password (such as `pwgen`), then use a new function “save factory default settings” which would save the current setting into a new “factory settings” flash partition. After that, a factory reset would reset to the factory installed password, not to the setting in the source code. Presumably the new factory default would be printed on a sticker, or something. Are there any other factory settings (settings unique to each device) that would benefit from being set like this? One downside to this approach is someone who orders 100 systems has to enter 100 unique passwords. 2. Create new account on first access. Specifically, default OpenBMC to use a new RestrictionMode=SetupAccess which: - (A) requires users to set up their credentials (at least: remove the default password) before they can leave that mode, and - (B) does not let the user do anything else, including other provisioning or operating the host, while in this mode. So we could manufacture the BMC with a default password, but require it to be changed as the first step to provision the BMC. We might want to make network services react to this new mode, for example, the phosphor-webui GUI would likely want to handle this specially, and most REST APIs would be restricted. Note this approach gives an attacker a window of time before the credentials are set up. I believe both of these approaches represent reasonable security practices which may satisfy laws regarding consumer products. For example, CA Law SB-327 https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB327 Are there guidelines we can follow? Can you find additional vulnerabilities with these approaches? Can we do better than this without requiring additional infrastructure? I plan to discuss this at the 2019-06-26 Security working group meeting: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1b7x9BaxsfcukQDqbvZsU2ehMq4xoJRQvLxxsDUWmAOI/ and would be happy to see ideas here. - Joseph