Subject: Re: [Xenomai-core] [PATCH] consolidate testsuite installation From: Philippe Gerum In-Reply-To: <457CA36C.5060805@domain.hid> References: <457BDF99.1020405@domain.hid> <1165778549.8255.17.camel@domain.hid> <457CA36C.5060805@domain.hid> Content-Type: text/plain Date: Mon, 11 Dec 2006 10:07:33 +0100 Message-Id: <1165828053.5025.8.camel@domain.hid> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Reply-To: rpm@xenomai.org List-Id: "Xenomai life and development \(bug reports, patches, discussions\)" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: Jan Kiszka Cc: xenomai-core On Mon, 2006-12-11 at 01:16 +0100, Jan Kiszka wrote: > Philippe Gerum wrote: > > On Sun, 2006-12-10 at 11:21 +0100, Jan Kiszka wrote: > >> The only part of the Xenomai user-space package not yet following > >> standard installation rules is the testsuite. It gets installed to > >> $prefix/testsuite, by default /usr/testsuite. The attached patch is an > >> approach to overcome this unusual layout. > > > > Ack. Implementation-wise, we have to fix the following though: > > > > xeno-load.in needs to be fixed, so that passing a single dot as argument > > correctly picks the default runinfo target in the current directory. > > This currently does not work as expected. > > [obviously now fixed in svn] > > > > > The second patch works around a problem with sudo relying on the > > contents of the user's PATH variable. This won't work for people using a > > version of sudo compiled with the secure path option by their favourite > > distro. In that case, /usr/xenomai/bin (or whatever the user picked to > > install xenomai) won't appear in that secure path, so the binary program > > given in the runinfo file won't be found. A possible option is to > > provide a relative path to locate the binary program, > > e.g. ../../../../bin/latency for the latency test, as the example patch > > shows. Not pretty, but the other way would need to autoconfiscate the > > runinfo files, or at least run them through sed before installing, so > > that we could substitute some placeholder with $exec_prefix. > > Relative paths are not fully safe, Why, provided the sudo sub-shell in xeno-load changes dir to the target_dir variable contents? -- Philippe.