Subject: RE: [RFC] Ability to allow undefined permissions and classes -v2 From: Eric Paris To: Stephen Smalley Cc: Joshua Brindle , Chad Sellers , selinux@tycho.nsa.gov In-Reply-To: <1171567664.32574.70.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> References: <6FE441CD9F0C0C479F2D88F959B015888BA220@exchange.columbia.tresys.com> <1171564421.32574.36.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> <1171565182.32574.50.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> <1171566336.18488.22.camel@localhost.localdomain> <1171567664.32574.70.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> Content-Type: text/plain Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2007 14:44:33 -0500 Message-Id: <1171568673.18488.25.camel@localhost.localdomain> Mime-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-selinux@tycho.nsa.gov List-Id: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov On Thu, 2007-02-15 at 14:27 -0500, Stephen Smalley wrote: > On Thu, 2007-02-15 at 14:05 -0500, Eric Paris wrote: > > > Basically, should I walk the policy and find out everything it knows > > nothing about or should I continue to just walk the kernel headers and > > and only allow 'unknown' things that aren't quite the same between the > > kernel headers and the policy? > > I'd stay with using the kernel headers as the basis. And I think you'll > want to disable this allow_unknown behavior when called from selinuxfs, > so create a separate security_compute_av_user() function to be called by > selinuxfs, and pass a flag down to the internal helper. > Sounds good, will do. I'll admit though i'm surprised the selinuxfs access interface uses security_compute_av rather than avc_has_perm_noaudit. Out of curiosity what is the reason for not wanting to cache those decisions? -Eric -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.