Subject: Re: access(2) vs. SELinux From: Eric Paris To: jwcart2@epoch.ncsc.mil Cc: Joshua Brindle , Chad Sellers , Stephen Smalley , selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, James Morris , Eric Paris , Daniel J Walsh In-Reply-To: <1240253727.2841.53.camel@moss-lions.epoch.ncsc.mil> References: <49EC8841.7050305@manicmethod.com> <1240240273.2562.67.camel@localhost.localdomain> <1240253727.2841.53.camel@moss-lions.epoch.ncsc.mil> Content-Type: text/plain Date: Mon, 20 Apr 2009 15:08:35 -0400 Message-Id: <1240254515.2562.113.camel@localhost.localdomain> Mime-Version: 1.0 Sender: owner-selinux@tycho.nsa.gov List-Id: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov On Mon, 2009-04-20 at 14:55 -0400, James Carter wrote: > On Mon, 2009-04-20 at 11:11 -0400, Eric Paris wrote: > > I strongly and vehemently oppose any solution that is a blanket > > dontaudit on access calls, even if there is a flag to dontdonaudit. > > This might be fine in "secure" shops where everyone understands and is > > willing to suffer some extra SELinux pain but not here. If SELinux gets > > in the way it better scream to high heavens for my customers. > > > > I think that what we need is a check to see if the domain is allowed to > call access() on the object. If it is not allowed, then a denial is > generated; if it is, then the results of the desired permission check is > returned, but denials are not audited. > > This would better reflect what is actually happening. When a domain > calls access(), it is really reading the security properties of the > object. Your still just talking about a big global dontaudit hammer on the EACCESS people get back from access(). Not only that, you propose a new permission every domain needs of which I don't see any security benefit (outside of maybe helping make sure people can't probe policy willy nilly). If access() had better return semantics than yes/no this might be a good approach, but I don't see how a single extra perm helps anything and I'm still railing against the global dontaudit hammer. -Eric -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.