From: Dave Hansen Subject: Re: Restriction of filesystem mounting Date: Tue, 15 Sep 2009 13:42:40 -0700 Message-ID: <1253047360.10449.11671.camel@nimitz> References: <20090915233527.3c0129ed@vingilot.sergknet> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: <20090915233527.3c0129ed-NDSVQgkCwZPOCvrUKRJuT16hYfS7NtTn@public.gmane.org> List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: containers-bounces-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org Errors-To: containers-bounces-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org To: Sergey Kononenko Cc: containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org List-Id: containers.vger.kernel.org On Tue, 2009-09-15 at 23:35 +0300, Sergey Kononenko wrote: > I've come across the need to restrict ability of mounting filesystems > inside container and probably forbid remounting of already mounted > filesystems in container namespace (mounted by lxc-start for example). > It semms that the obvious solution is to drop capability from bounding > set of processes inside container. Unfortunately there is no separate > capability for mount/umount and dropping of CAP_SYS_ADMIN is > unacceptable in my case. Could you explain a little more why you have this requirement? Anybody in their own filesystem namespace can do no harm to users in other namespaces. What's the worry? -- Dave