Return-Path: Received: from mx1-v2.alinto.net (mx1-v2.alinto.net [83.145.109.31]) by mail.saout.de (Postfix) with ESMTP for ; Tue, 28 Dec 2010 15:05:18 +0100 (CET) Received: from http3alinto.alinto.net (http3alinto.alinto.net [83.145.109.63]) by mx1-v2.alinto.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id DDC47580190 for ; Tue, 28 Dec 2010 15:05:17 +0100 (CET) Message-ID: <1293545117.4d19ee9d718e5@www.inmano.com> Date: Tue, 28 Dec 2010 15:05:17 +0100 From: octane indice In-Reply-To: <4D19C3FE.1000100@redhat.com> References: <1293466212.4d18ba64b28dc@www.inmano.com> <20101227215200.GA6681@tansi.org> <1293524963.4d199fe3b7cb1@www.inmano.com> <4D19C3FE.1000100@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Subject: Re: [dm-crypt] using a salt for encrypting blocks List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: dm-crypt@saout.de En r=E9ponse =E0 Milan Broz : > > My idea is to cipher _all_ blocks by changing the salt. >=20 > You forgot one fundamental thing. >=20 > If an attacker can do snapshots in time (IOW he can read the > cipher text device after user performed some changes) he has > either physical access to the system or he has administrator > permissions. >=20 physical access. > This allows more powerfull attacks already (installing > keylogger I also use full disk encryption.=20 [You can say that I don't have to care for an encrypted file, but yes, I have to. The attacker can allways watch modified blocks, either it's ciphered another time by FDE. the position of files doesn't change often in a disk. So if somebody has repeated access to my FDE system, then the password, he can know where the 100Mbyte file resides, then check which blocks have changed on the encrypted partition.] > modifying kernel I'm using a TPM chip to enforce that everything in my /boot partition (kernel, initramfs, bootloader and options) is unchanged between reboots. > bios, I don't really believe in that. By the way, BIOS with TPM have one part read-only unchangeable, and TPM chips guarantee (that's its purpose) that it's unchanged. > ...). >=20 > If an attacker has such access nothing will help you. > The chain is weaker somewhere else here. > I hope I took care all of these problems. =20 > > not so much, depending on how much data you cipher. > > I use files of less than 100Mbytes and cipher them. On > > close, a full recipher wouldn't take long. >=20 > Then use encryption on filesystem level (e.g. with CTR mode, > iow stream mode) and not sector level block device encryption. >=20 I'm not sure I understand (??) A stream mode would help? With filesystem level encryption? But maybe it's not the right mailing list if the talk goes that way. > ------------------- Fin du message d'origine --------------------- Envoy=E9 avec Inmano, ma messagerie renversante et gratuite : http://www.in= mano.com