Received: from list by lists.gnu.org with archive (Exim 4.71) id 1VI5wK-0000gl-Ex for mharc-grub-devel@gnu.org; Fri, 06 Sep 2013 19:59:48 -0400 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:4830:134:3::10]:54755) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1VI5wH-0000dE-Vu for grub-devel@gnu.org; Fri, 06 Sep 2013 19:59:47 -0400 Received: from Debian-exim by eggs.gnu.org with spam-scanned (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1VI5wH-0002jZ-0D for grub-devel@gnu.org; Fri, 06 Sep 2013 19:59:45 -0400 Received: from mail-qc0-x249.google.com ([2607:f8b0:400d:c01::249]:58254) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1VI5wG-0002jV-Rn for grub-devel@gnu.org; Fri, 06 Sep 2013 19:59:44 -0400 Received: by mail-qc0-f201.google.com with SMTP id e16so450604qcx.4 for ; Fri, 06 Sep 2013 16:59:44 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20120113; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to:references; bh=B7cDJypPQG2nPne6I/VELgpOCymc7Z8DQElpwPr5yGA=; b=Jd3FISC7tCQY0Ljfi1WiKSUdYLG4SFifQ/9gNtN6nGnru0kpTvO8FWisxnN1pNdYke c5rrVNo2vWs3omqgqZ4h5oZGDtZl8QMFbJrkFR+xQm2KRtsXMgR55e1//Q+tUxMaTi14 IbBb+5o7L2WO7zbozpq9/5e9PnV7r5O8bkDsPit+FjMdL5RGUVTj3ZN+ZL1t/Yn8CVpx jpbvIe+yVeZVtU6p5/fmNbpLdGGspYhPIr8lxs423bxq6iF4eHcCqZ1H/yLvZzwuARog cO8kxlSSGSE2BSdXGtkJp7xjuUaGUyAvxWCxdxTl0spXlT4B6Fl2ww2xPJQjjLBebyl6 tYYg== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to :references; bh=B7cDJypPQG2nPne6I/VELgpOCymc7Z8DQElpwPr5yGA=; b=Bm4y5Ld/C/fYLzWs5D/pWb8FWarsZJcU2TSvJ5BHz1fMq+DmKJZORixngDhjmVyIv7 bcOlgUyy1DCwyLKQqpPczHilCGHR26FNwCy8vxxhXtDIxfwJ6e6nSZ39UqbeeYodcL7i z7RHwa/K3ZOR51EyjDToMpgYiSQfj6V/uMgVkkJA/FKOdm2G4MHFOkVukI84xGFotxH/ NMjkBVCOQLw5zcH4TnwEqmXssiuniASNKK1UgQUHIsmCOXirM0Jjn/ld9qIG2kOdtRR1 +dx3It0BSm4OBMZRZ+uV2sL+RpAxyxEp8fF4XgXCt0UQ3qCfSbZmdmFfuL/SN387ZWaq eLaw== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQmW2riamp/cH0nrkCFLmt9eSyYoJF/9PbEJuLDxy8aY2G9QthMmvgSls5Ur6HUO3kWsTzAmKqZSHpSEVV6fCMbMIKf0oVn3agcs/Sm5Y+knEhd5N3xSSK8QvS72yJp6yyDw34jTmUlip4HYlogwkz0VXK9TGoEO0j9SKmblYW3ldm/1F0MrHHU0gYXdp+gEnkuzDTpW2VUCfKj88a9UGZ6s2mRbyZ3T+AgmrcAv5jvpvOkZ/mY= X-Received: by 10.236.87.232 with SMTP id y68mr1733844yhe.19.1378511984336; Fri, 06 Sep 2013 16:59:44 -0700 (PDT) Received: from corp2gmr1-1.hot.corp.google.com (corp2gmr1-1.hot.corp.google.com [172.24.189.92]) by gmr-mx.google.com with ESMTPS id h70si19539yhk.2.1969.12.31.16.00.00 (version=TLSv1.1 cipher=AES128-SHA bits=128/128); Fri, 06 Sep 2013 16:59:44 -0700 (PDT) Received: from yinz.mtv.corp.google.com (yinz.mtv.corp.google.com [172.17.81.122]) by corp2gmr1-1.hot.corp.google.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0A95731C244; Fri, 6 Sep 2013 16:59:44 -0700 (PDT) Received: by yinz.mtv.corp.google.com (Postfix, from userid 184367) id C0AE8C0763; Fri, 6 Sep 2013 16:59:43 -0700 (PDT) From: Jon McCune To: grub-devel@gnu.org Subject: [PATCH v3 2/3] load_env support for whitelisting which variables are read from an env file Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2013 16:59:17 -0700 Message-Id: <1378511958-19974-3-git-send-email-jonmccune@google.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.8.4 In-Reply-To: <1378511958-19974-1-git-send-email-jonmccune@google.com> References: <1378511958-19974-1-git-send-email-jonmccune@google.com> X-detected-operating-system: by eggs.gnu.org: Error: Malformed IPv6 address (bad octet value). X-Received-From: 2607:f8b0:400d:c01::249 Cc: Jon McCune X-BeenThere: grub-devel@gnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.14 Precedence: list Reply-To: The development of GNU GRUB List-Id: The development of GNU GRUB List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 06 Sep 2013 23:59:47 -0000 This gives load_env support for naming variables that is the same as save_env. This is useful to prevent potentially unwanted variables within a grubenv file from impacting the behavior of a configuration, especially if using check_signatures=enforce but wishing to retain support for savedefault, boot_once, and similar. This version of this patch drops all direct interaction with the logic in verify.c. The author of grub.cfg must take care to disable and re-enable check_signatures as appropriate. Signed-off-by: Jon McCune --- grub-core/commands/loadenv.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/grub-core/commands/loadenv.c b/grub-core/commands/loadenv.c index a431499..5828f5f 100644 --- a/grub-core/commands/loadenv.c +++ b/grub-core/commands/loadenv.c @@ -122,15 +122,59 @@ set_var (const char *name, const char *value) return 0; } +#define MAX_VAR_NAME 1024 +/* TODO: eliminate the need for these to be global */ +static grub_size_t whitelist_len = 0; +static char **whitelist_vars = NULL; +static int +/* Assumptions: name, value, and each element of whitelist_vars[] are non-NULL + and NULL-terminated. */ +set_var_whitelist (const char *name, const char *value) +{ + grub_size_t i; + if (whitelist_len < 1 || whitelist_vars == NULL) + return GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE; + + /* search for 'name' in the whitelist */ + for (i = 0; i < whitelist_len; i++) + { + if (0 == grub_strncmp (name, whitelist_vars[i], MAX_VAR_NAME)) + { + /* TODO: also validate the characters in the variables */ + grub_dprintf ("crypt", "set_var_whitelist APPOVED: %s=%s\n", + name, value); + grub_env_set (name, value); + return 0; + } + } + + grub_dprintf ("crypt", + "set_var_whitelist REFUSING TO SET name='%s' value='%s'\n", + name, value); + /* Still considered success */ + return 0; +} + +/* Load environment variables from a file. Accepts a flag which can override + the file from which variables are read. If additional parameters are passed + (argc > 0), then those are interpreted as a whitelist of environment + variables whose values can be changed based on the contents of the file, and + the file is never signature-checked. + Otherwise, all variables from the file are processed, and the file must be + properly signed when check_signatures=enforce. */ static grub_err_t -grub_cmd_load_env (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, - int argc __attribute__ ((unused)), - char **args __attribute__ ((unused))) +grub_cmd_load_env (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, char **args) { struct grub_arg_list *state = ctxt->state; grub_file_t file; grub_envblk_t envblk; + /* argc > 0 indicates caller provided a whitelist of variables to read */ + if (argc > 0) + { + whitelist_len = (argc >= 0) ? argc : 0; + whitelist_vars = args; + } file = open_envblk_file ((state[0].set) ? state[0].arg : 0); if (!file) return grub_errno; @@ -139,10 +183,12 @@ grub_cmd_load_env (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, if (!envblk) goto fail; - grub_envblk_iterate (envblk, set_var); + grub_envblk_iterate (envblk, argc > 0 ? set_var_whitelist : set_var); grub_envblk_close (envblk); fail: + whitelist_len = 0; + whitelist_vars = NULL; grub_file_close (file); return grub_errno; } @@ -387,7 +433,8 @@ static grub_extcmd_t cmd_load, cmd_list, cmd_save; GRUB_MOD_INIT (loadenv) { cmd_load = - grub_register_extcmd ("load_env", grub_cmd_load_env, 0, N_("[-f FILE]"), + grub_register_extcmd ("load_env", grub_cmd_load_env, 0, + N_("[-f FILE] [whitelisted_variable_name] [...]"), N_("Load variables from environment block file."), options); cmd_list = -- 1.8.4