Received: from goalie.tycho.ncsc.mil (goalie [144.51.242.250]) by tarius.tycho.ncsc.mil (8.14.4/8.14.4) with ESMTP id u669hUeK015341 for ; Wed, 6 Jul 2016 05:43:30 -0400 Received: from int-mx09.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com (int-mx09.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.22]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4B115201FA for ; Wed, 6 Jul 2016 09:43:29 +0000 (UTC) Received: from moo.home.annexia.org (ovpn-204-45.brq.redhat.com [10.40.204.45]) by int-mx09.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com (8.14.4/8.14.4) with ESMTP id u669hQMP007869 for ; Wed, 6 Jul 2016 05:43:28 -0400 From: "Richard W.M. Jones" To: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov Subject: [PATCH] libselinux: If autorelabel, force permissive mode. Date: Wed, 6 Jul 2016 10:43:22 +0100 Message-Id: <1467798202-6412-2-git-send-email-rjones@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: <1467798202-6412-1-git-send-email-rjones@redhat.com> References: <1467798202-6412-1-git-send-email-rjones@redhat.com> List-Id: "Security-Enhanced Linux \(SELinux\) mailing list" List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Signed-off-by: Richard W.M. Jones --- libselinux/src/load_policy.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/libselinux/src/load_policy.c b/libselinux/src/load_policy.c index 4f39fc7..337a8a9 100644 --- a/libselinux/src/load_policy.c +++ b/libselinux/src/load_policy.c @@ -315,7 +315,8 @@ hidden_def(selinux_mkload_policy) */ int selinux_init_load_policy(int *enforce) { - int rc = 0, orig_enforce = 0, seconfig = -2, secmdline = -1; + int rc = 0, orig_enforce = 0, seconfig = -2, secmdline = -1, + seautorelabel = -1; FILE *cfg; char *buf; @@ -332,6 +333,17 @@ int selinux_init_load_policy(int *enforce) */ selinux_getenforcemode(&seconfig); + /* + * If /.autorelabel exists then we should start in permissive + * mode because (a) the labels on the filesystem are known to + * be bogus and so should not be trusted to make security + * decisions, but more practically (b) mislabelled files may + * cause services & processes required for relabelling to fail. + */ + if (access("/.autorelabel", F_OK) == 0) { + seautorelabel = 0; + } + /* Check for an override of the mode via the kernel command line. */ rc = mount("proc", "/proc", "proc", 0, 0); cfg = fopen("/proc/cmdline", "r"); @@ -342,12 +354,18 @@ int selinux_init_load_policy(int *enforce) fclose(cfg); return -1; } - if (fgets(buf, selinux_page_size, cfg) && - (tmp = strstr(buf, "enforcing="))) { - if (tmp == buf || isspace(*(tmp - 1))) { + if (fgets(buf, selinux_page_size, cfg)) { + if ((tmp = strstr(buf, "enforcing=")) && + (tmp == buf || isspace(*(tmp - 1)))) { secmdline = atoi(tmp + sizeof("enforcing=") - 1); } + else if ((tmp = strstr(buf, "autorelabel")) && + (tmp == buf || isspace(*(tmp - 1))) && + (tmp + sizeof("autorelabel") - 1 == '\0' || + isspace(tmp + sizeof("autorelabel") - 1))) { + seautorelabel = 0; + } } fclose(cfg); free(buf); @@ -357,7 +375,9 @@ int selinux_init_load_policy(int *enforce) * Determine the final desired mode. * Command line argument takes precedence, then config file. */ - if (secmdline >= 0) + if (seautorelabel >= 0) + *enforce = seautorelabel; + else if (secmdline >= 0) *enforce = secmdline; else if (seconfig >= 0) *enforce = seconfig; -- 2.7.4