From: will.deacon@arm.com (Will Deacon) Date: Mon, 5 Feb 2018 15:34:15 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 0/9] Mitigations against spectre-v1 in the arm64 Linux kernel Message-ID: <1517844864-15887-1-git-send-email-will.deacon@arm.com> To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org List-Id: linux-arm-kernel.lists.infradead.org Hi all, This series implements some mitigations against spectre-v1 for arm64. It broadly follows the work that has been done for x86, by implementing: * A back-end version of array_index_mask_nospec() to suppress any compiler optimisations that could introduce unwanted speculative paths * Masking of the syscall number to restrict speculation through the syscall table * Masking of __user pointers prior to deference in uaccess routines The latter introduces complications in access_ok and set_fs which are also handled in this series. Cheers, Will --->8 Robin Murphy (3): arm64: Implement array_index_mask_nospec() arm64: Make USER_DS an inclusive limit arm64: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess speculation Will Deacon (6): arm64: barrier: Add CSDB macros to control data-value prediction arm64: entry: Ensure branch through syscall table is bounded under speculation arm64: uaccess: Prevent speculative use of the current addr_limit arm64: uaccess: Don't bother eliding access_ok checks in __{get,put}_user arm64: uaccess: Mask __user pointers for __arch_{clear,copy_*}_user arm64: futex: Mask __user pointers prior to dereference arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h | 18 +++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h | 22 ++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/futex.h | 9 ++- arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 3 + arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 155 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c | 4 +- arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 6 +- arch/arm64/lib/clear_user.S | 6 +- arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S | 5 +- arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 4 +- 10 files changed, 170 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-) -- 2.1.4