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charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-purgate-ID: tlsNG-720697/1779289729-81F76161-96B95780/10/73395122804 X-purgate-type: spam X-purgate-size: 7236 On 5/20/26 4:21 PM, Jan Beulich wrote: > On 20.05.2026 15:40, Oleksii Kurochko wrote: >> >> >> On 5/20/26 2:03 PM, Jan Beulich wrote: >>> On 20.05.2026 13:33, Oleksii Kurochko wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> On 5/19/26 1:53 PM, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>>> On 19.05.2026 13:22, Oleksii Kurochko wrote: >>>>>> On 5/19/26 12:55 PM, Oleksii Kurochko wrote: >>>>>>> On 5/19/26 11:37 AM, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>>>>>> On 19.05.2026 10:39, Oleksii Kurochko wrote: >>>>>>>>> vcpu_info_reset() maps v->vcpu_info_area.map to the per-vcpu slot inside >>>>>>>>> the domain's shared_info page for vcpus with id < XEN_LEGACY_MAX_VCPUS, >>>>>>>>> and falls back to dummy_vcpu_info for vcpus beyond that limit. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> However, it does not guard against d->shared_info being NULL.  The >>>>>>>>> shared_info() macro expands to a member access through d->shared_info, >>>>>>>>> so when an architecture does not allocate a shared_info page the >>>>>>>>> dereference triggers UBSAN: >>>>>>>>>    UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in common/domain.c:325:10 >>>>>>>>>    member access within null pointer of type 'struct shared_info_t' >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Extend the existing fallback condition to also cover the case where no >>>>>>>>> shared_info page has been allocated, mapping the vcpu to dummy_vcpu_info >>>>>>>>> instead. This is the correct behaviour: dummy_vcpu_info already serves >>>>>>>>> as the safe stand-in for vcpus that have no usable shared_info slot. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Fixes: 295514ff75506 ("common: convert vCPU info area registration") >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> I question this, largely (but not only) because I also ... >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Oleksii Kurochko >>>>>>>>> Reviewed-by: Baptiste Le Duc >>>>>>>>> --- >>>>>>>>> RISC-V does not allocate a shared_info page at the momemnt because its >>>>>>>>> guests run in dom0less mode and do not use the Xen PV ABI, so >>>>>>>>> d->shared_info remains NULL throughout domain lifetime. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> ... question this mode of operation. Yes, you may (for now) be able to >>>>>>>> get >>>>>>>> away without, but e.g. event channels will want supporting at some point. >>>>>>>> Which will require a shared info page. Better put that in place right >>>>>>>> away, >>>>>>>> even if the guests you test with don't use it (yet). Certain other common >>>>>>>> code also assumes d->shared_info to never be NULL for an alive domain. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Would it be fine than to allocate it in arch_domain_create() ... : >>>>>>> >>>>>>>     if ( (d->shared_info = alloc_xenheap_pages(0, 0)) == NULL ) >>>>>>>         goto fail; >>>>>>> >>>>>>>     clear_page(d->shared_info); >>>>>>> >>>>>>> ... but without calling share_xen_page_with_guest() after that >>>>>>> allocation as share_xen_page_with_guest() isn't implemented at the moment? >>>>> >>>>> I would have said "yes" here, but ... >>>>> >>>>>> Or could it be an option for all arch-s move allocation of >>>>>> d->shared_info to domain_create() in common just after arch_domain_create()? >>>>> >>>>> ... Andrew's reply pretty much rules out not only this option, but the >>>>> shared-info-page concept as a whole (for RISC-V). See my reply there. In >>>>> the meantime, the change as suggested may then indeed be what we want to >>>>> go with, albeit (a) with a better description and (b) perhaps covering >>>>> all d->shared_info uses. >>>> >>>> Looking at guest kernel code (Linux), FIFO is tried first, so if RISC-V >>>> is going to support only FIFO, d->shared_info could legally be NULL. >>>> >>>> Looking at the Xen side, if an architecture decides to support only >>>> FIFO, d->shared_info is touched only in vcpu_info_reset(), which is >>>> called from vcpu_create(). >>>> >>>> All other places where d->shared_info is accessed should not be >>>> reachable except for one case in event_fifo.c: when a guest issues the >>>> EVTCHNOP_init_control hypercall, setup_ports() reads from shared_info(d, >>>> evtchn_pending): >>>> static void setup_ports(struct domain *d, unsigned int prev_evtchns) >>>> { >>>> ... >>>> if ( guest_test_bit(d, port, &shared_info(d, evtchn_pending)) >>>> evtchn->pending = true; >>>> ... >>>> } >>>> } >>>> >>>> This looks like it handles the transition from the 2L ABI to the FIFO >>>> ABI: if a guest started with 2L and then switched to FIFO, any events >>>> already pending in shared_info(d, evtchn_pending) need to be migrated to >>>> FIFO's per-channel evtchn->pending flag. But it looks like I am missing >>>> something here as I mentioned at the start that Linux uses or FIFO or 2L. >>>> >>>> Am I missing something? >>> >>> Quite likely you aren't, but I didn't check. My earlier "covering all" may >>> well resolve to merely stating things accordingly in the patch description. >> >> If either FIFO or 2L can be used, shouldn't guest_test_bit(d, port, >> &shared_info(d, evtchn_pending)) in setup_ports() be dropped? If FIFO >> was chosen by Linux, there won't be any events in &shared_info(d, >> evtchn_pending), so it is essentially dead code that could just be >> dropped. > > Why would it be dead code? Who said that a guest couldn't to 2L for a > while, then switch to FIFO? Think of boot loaders, for example. I jsut based my assumption on Linux use case, if generally such switch is okay then I will add to my original patch what I suggested here ... > > Jan > >> Or would it be better to leave it and skip only if >> d->shared_info is allocated: if ( d->shared_info && guest_test_bit(...) >> ) to cover the case when a guest wants to switch from 2L to FIFO (if >> that is even a possible case at all, since as I mentioned above, the >> guest (Linux) chooses the event ABI once and it stays for its lifetime)? ... + refactor commit message: ``` xen/domain: fix UBSAN null pointer dereference of d->shared_info It is legal to have d->shared_info equal to NULL for architectures which support only the FIFO ABI for event channel management. Having d->shared_info == NULL leads to a UBSAN issue on such architectures: UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in common/domain.c:325:10 member access within null pointer of type 'struct shared_info_t' vcpu_info_reset() maps v->vcpu_info_area.map to the per-vcpu slot inside the domain's shared_info page for vcpus with id < XEN_LEGACY_MAX_VCPUS, and falls back to dummy_vcpu_info for vcpus beyond that limit. Extend the existing fallback condition to also cover the case where no shared_info page has been allocated, mapping the vcpu to dummy_vcpu_info instead. This is the correct behaviour: dummy_vcpu_info already serves as the safe stand-in for vcpus that have no usable shared_info slot. Additionally, if an architecture supports only the FIFO ABI, setup_ports() should be updated to avoid a NULL pointer dereference of d->shared_info, since in that case there will be no pending events in shared_info->evtchn_pending and the pending flag of the FIFO event channel does not need to be set to true. ``` ~ Oleksii