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[71.192.139.151]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 70sm5971892qkk.10.2021.01.15.15.15.55 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Fri, 15 Jan 2021 15:15:55 -0800 (PST) Subject: Re: [PATCH] doc: trusted-encrypted: updates with TEE as a new trust source (update) To: Jarkko Sakkinen , Sumit Garg Cc: Mimi Zohar , linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, Elaine Palmer , George Wilson , zgu@us.ibm.com References: <20201209164249.715178-1-zohar@linux.ibm.com> <20201211081454.GA5262@kernel.org> From: Elaine Palmer Message-ID: <19d3547b-c285-aa98-0cc3-cc55ef09a1b9@gmail.com> Date: Fri, 15 Jan 2021 18:15:51 -0500 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.16; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/78.6.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Language: en-US Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org On 1/13/21 4:23 PM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Tue, Jan 12, 2021 at 10:55:44AM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote: >> On Sun, 10 Jan 2021 at 08:46, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: >>> On Mon, Jan 04, 2021 at 06:06:33PM +0530, Sumit Garg wrote: >>>> Hi Jarkko, On Fri, 11 Dec 2020 at 13:44, Jarkko Sakkinen >>>> wrote: >>>>> On Wed, Dec 09, 2020 at 11:42:49AM -0500, Mimi Zohar wrote: >>>>>> From: Elaine Palmer Update trusted key >>>>>> documentation with additional comparisons between discrete TPMs >>>>>> and TEE. Signed-off-by: Elaine Palmer >>>>> Right, so OP-TEE is not the same as TEE. I did not know this and >>>>> the patch set does not underline this. I re-checked the patches >>>>> and none of them say explicitly that OP-TEE is an application >>>>> living inside TEE. >>>> This patch-set provides a trust source based on generic TEE >>>> interface where underlying TEE implementations like OP-TEE >>>> (drivers/tee/optee/), AMD TEE (drivers/tee/amdtee/) etc. can easily >>>> be hooked up. And this is similar to the TPM interface where >>>> underlying TPM implementations like discrete TPM, virtual TPM, >>>> firmware TPM etc. can be easily hooked up. >>>>> This essentially means that the backend needs to be renamed as >>>>> "op_tee". >>>> I don't see any need for this, see above. >>> Right, TEE is a protocol standard, just like TPM, and OP-TEE is one >>> implementation of this interface? I.e. OP-TEE does not define API >>> that is hard bound to OP-TEE? >> Yes, OP-TEE doesn't define a hard bound client interface API. The >> client API is based on TEE client API specification [1] from >> GlobalPlatform. [1] >> http://globalplatform.org/specs-library/tee-client-api-specification/ >> -Sumit > Thanks, bookmarked. No need for name change. /Jarkko This discussion has illustrated that even those of us who live and breathe this stuff could use clarification.  Shouldn't we recommend that the Trust Source have a hardware root of trust?  We could be even more specific.  For example, the documentation could recommend that a TPM be evaluated under "TCG Protection Profile for PC Client Specific TPM 2.0" or later and a TEE be evaluated under GlobalPlatform "TEE Protection Profile v1.3, GPD_SPE_021" or later.  Of course, our recommendation would not be a requirement, but it would provide guidance for deployment as well as precedent for future Trust Sources. I know where I'm getting stuck is on TEEs as a concept vs TEEs with specific hardware requirements and interfaces. The same applies to TPMs.  There are hardware TPMs that meet the protection profile and there are other implementations (e.g., vTPMs) that use the same interface, but aren't anchored in hardware. I know if I were deploying a server, mobile device, or IoT device, I'd want to know exactly what is protecting my keys.  A generic TPM or TEE doesn't tell me enough. -Elaine