From: "cron2 (Code Review)" cron2 uploaded patch set #5 to the change originally cr=
eated by plaisthos. The following approvals got outdated=
and were removed:
Code-Review+2 by flichtenheldAllow trailing \r and \n in control channel m=
essage
Writing a reason from a script will easily end up adding extr=
a \r\n characters
at the end of the reason. Our current code pushes this=
to the peer. So be more
liberal in accepting these message.
Gith=
ub: closes OpenVPN/openvpn#568
Change-Id: I47c992b6b73b1475cbff8a28f=
720cf50dc1fbe3e
Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <arne@...1227...>
A=
cked-by: Frank Lichtenheld <frank@...2641...>
Message-Id: <2024=
0710140623.172829-1-frank@...2641...>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.c=
om/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg28910.html
Signed-off-by: Gert=
Doering <gert@...1296...>
---
M src/openvpn/forward.c
M src=
/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c
M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h
M tests/unit_tests/openvpn=
/test_pkt.c
4 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
=
pre>git pull ssh://gerrit.openvpn.net:29418/openvpn refs/changes/72/672/5
diff --git a/src/openvpn/forward.c b/src/openvpn/forward.cindex 71b7167..40b7cc4 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/forward=
.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/forward.c
@@ -290,41 +=
290,14 @@
struct buffer buf =3D alloc_buf_gc(len, &=
;gc);
if (tls_rec_payload(c->c2.tls_multi, &buf=
))
{
-
while (BLEN(&buf) > 1)
{
- =
/* commands on the control channel are seperated by 0x00 bytes.
- * cmdlen does not =
include the 0 byte of the string */
- int cmdlen =3D (int)strnlen(BSTR(&buf), BLEN(=
&buf));
+ =
struct buffer cmdbuf =3D extract_command_buffer(&buf, &gc);
- =
if (cmdlen < BLEN(&buf))
+ if (cmdbuf.len > 0)
=
{
- =
/* include the NUL byte and ensure NUL termination */
- int cmdlen =3D (int)strle=
n(BSTR(&buf)) + 1;
=
-
- /* C=
onstruct a buffer that only holds the current command and
- * its closing NUL byte=
*/
- st=
ruct buffer cmdbuf =3D alloc_buf_gc(cmdlen, &gc);
- buf_write(&cmdbuf, BPTR=
(&buf), cmdlen);
-<=
/span>
- /* che=
ck we have only printable characters or null byte in the
- * command string and no=
newlines */
- =
if (!string_check_buf(&buf, CC_PRINT | CC_NULL, CC_CRLF))=
- {
=
- msg(D_PUSH_E=
RRORS, "WARNING: Received control with invalid characters: %s",=
span>
- =
format_hex(BPTR(&buf), BLEN(&buf), 256, &gc));
- }
- else
- {
- parse_incoming_control_cha=
nnel_command(c, &cmdbuf);
- }
+ parse_incoming_control_channel_command(c, &cmdbuf=
);
}
- else
- {
- =
msg(D_PUSH_ERRORS, "WARNING: Ignoring control channel &=
quot;
- =
"message command without NUL termination");
- }
- buf_advance(&buf, cmdlen);
}
}
else
diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c
index 2ec0b2f..689cd7f 100644
--- a/src/openvp=
n/ssl_pkt.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c
@@ =
-557,3 +557,43 @@
}
return false;=
}
+=
+struct buffer
+extract_command_buffer(st=
ruct buffer *buf, struct gc_arena *gc)
+{
=
+ /* commands on the control channel are seperated by 0x00 bytes.=
+ * cmdlen does not inc=
lude the 0 byte of the string */
+ int cmdlen =3D (int)strnlen(BSTR(buf), BLEN(buf));<=
br>+
+ if (cmdlen >=3D BLEN(buf))+ {
+ buf_advance(buf, cmdlen);+ /* Return empty buffer *=
/
+ struct buf=
fer empty =3D { 0 };
=
+ return empty;
+ }
+
=
+ /* include the NUL byte an=
d ensure NUL termination */
+ cmdlen +=3D 1;
+
+ /* Cons=
truct a buffer that only holds the current command and
+ * its closing NUL byte */
+ struct buffer cmdbuf =3D =
alloc_buf_gc(cmdlen, gc);
+ buf_write(&cmdbuf, BPTR(buf), cmdlen);
+
+ /* Remove \r and \n at the end of the buffer to avoid
+ * problems with s=
cripts and other that add extra \r and \n */
+ buf_chomp(&cmdbuf);
+
+ /* check we have only printable characters or null byte =
in the
+ * comman=
d string and no newlines */
+ if (!string_check_buf(&cmdbuf, CC_PRINT | CC_NULL, CC_CRLF)=
)
+ {+ msg(D_PUSH_ERRORS, "=
;WARNING: Received control with invalid characters: %s",
+ cmdbuf.len =3D 0;
+ }
+
+ buf_=
advance(buf, cmdlen);
+ return cmdbuf;
=
+}
diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt=
.h
index 88b9e8c..c8a27fb 100644
--- a/src/=
openvpn/ssl_pkt.h
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h
uint8_t heade=
r,
bool request_resend_wkc);
+
+/**
+ * Extracts a control channel message from bu=
f and adjusts the size of
+ * buf after the message has been extracted
+ * @param buf The buffer the message should=
be extracted from
+ =
* @param gc gc_arena to be used for the returned buffer and displaying=
span>
+ * diagn=
ostic messages
+ * @r=
eturn A buffer with a control channel message or a buffer with<=
br>+ * with length=
0 if there is no message or the message has
+ * invalid characters.
+struct buffer
+extract_command_buffer(struct buffer *buf, struct gc_are=
na *gc);
+
=
static inline const char *
packet_opcode_name(int o=
p)
{
diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn=
/test_pkt.c b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c
index 108=
4d66..741c982 100644
--- a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pk=
t.c
+++ b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c
free_tas(&tas_server);
}
+static void
+test_extract_control_message(void **ut_state)
+{
+ struct gc_arena gc =3D gc_new();
+ struct buffer input_buf =3D alloc_buf=
_gc(1024, &gc);
+=
+ /* This message=
will have a \0x00 at the end since it is a C string */
+ const char input[] =3D "valid =
control message\r\n\0\0Invalid\r\none\0valid one again";
+ buf_write(&input_buf, input, sizeof(input));=
+ struct buffer c=
md1 =3D extract_command_buffer(&input_buf, &gc);
+ struct buffer cmd2 =3D extract_com=
mand_buffer(&input_buf, &gc);
+ struct buffer cmd3 =3D extract_command_buffer(&in=
put_buf, &gc);
+ =
struct buffer cmd4 =3D extract_command_buffer(&input_buf, &gc);<=
/span>
+ struct buffer cm=
d5 =3D extract_command_buffer(&input_buf, &gc);
+
+ assert_string_equal(BSTR(&cmd1), "valid contr=
ol message");
+ =
/* empty message with just a \0x00 */
+ assert_int_equal(cmd2.len, 1);
+ assert_string_equal(BSTR(&cmd2)=
, "");
+ =
assert_int_equal(cmd3.len, 0);
+ assert_string_equal(BSTR(&cmd4), "valid one again&=
quot;);
+ assert_i=
nt_equal(cmd5.len, 0);
+
+ const uint8_=
t nonull[6] =3D { 'n', 'o', ' ', 'N', '=
U', 'L'};
+ struct buffer nonull_buf =3D alloc_buf_gc(1024, &gc);
<=
span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+
+ buf_write(&nonull_buf, nonull, sizeof(nonu=
ll));
+ struct buf=
fer nonullcmd =3D extract_command_buffer(&nonull_buf, &gc);<=
br>+ assert_int_equal(nonull=
cmd.len, 0);
+=
+ gc_free(&gc);
+}
+
int
ma=
in(void)
{
@@ -640,6 +674,7 @@
<=
span> cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hmac_tls_auth),
=
cmocka_unit_test(test_generate_reset_packet_plain),
+ cmocka_unit_test(test=
_extract_control_message)
};
<=
br> #if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL)
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