From: "plaisthos (Code Review)" Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2023 11:28:02 +0000 References: Reply-To: arne-openvpn@...1227..., openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, frank@...2641... Message-ID: <1ddeb3a3dfc9ce8452e6db42302f420eb1226910-HTML@...2715...> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Disposition: inline Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="fJbyPSL9e/c="; charset=UTF-8 Subject: [Openvpn-devel] [M] Change in openvpn[master]: Allow the TLS session to send out TLS alerts List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: flichtenheld Cc: openvpn-devel --fJbyPSL9e/c= Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Attention is currently required from: flichtenheld. Hello flichtenheld, I'd like you to do a code review. Please visit http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/449?usp=3Demail to review the following change. Change subject: Allow the TLS session to send out TLS alerts ...................................................................... Allow the TLS session to send out TLS alerts Previous OpenVPN versions shut down the TLS control channel immediately when encountering an error. This also meant that we would not send out TLS alerts to notify a client about potential problems like mismatching TLS versions or having no common cipher. This commit adds a new key_state S_ERROR_PRE which still allows to send out the remaining TLS packets of the control session which are typically the alert message and then going to S_ERROR. We do not wait for retries. So this is more a one-shot notify but that is acceptable in this situation. Sending out alerts is a slight compromise in security as alerts give out a bit of information that otherwise is not given out. But since all other consumers TLS implementation are already doing this and TLS implementation (nowadays) are very careful not to leak (sensitive) information by alerts and since the user experience is much better with alerts, this compromise is worth it. Change-Id: I0ad48915004ddee587e97c8ed190ba8ee989e48d --- M Changes.rst M src/openvpn/ssl.c M src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h M src/openvpn/ssl_common.h M src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c M src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c 6 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) git pull ssh://gerrit.openvpn.net:29418/openvpn refs/changes/49/449/1 diff --git a/Changes.rst b/Changes.rst index 3676dce..4c8be39 100644 --- a/Changes.rst +++ b/Changes.rst @@ -1,5 +1,16 @@ Overview of changes in 2.7 =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D= =3D=3D +New features +------------ +TLS alerts + OpenVPN 2.7 will send out TLS alerts to peer informing them if the TLS + session shuts down or when the TLS implementation informs the peer abo= ut + an error in the TLS session (e.g. mismatching TLS versions). This impr= oves + the user experience as the client shows an error instead of running in= to + a timeout when the server just stop responding completely. + +Deprecated features +------------------- ``secret`` support has been removed by default. static key mode (non-TLS) is no longer considered "good and secure eno= ugh" for today's requirements. Use TLS mode instead. If deploying a PKI CA diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl.c b/src/openvpn/ssl.c index b4cd8f5..16d3d22 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/ssl.c +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl.c @@ -853,6 +853,9 @@ case S_ERROR: return "S_ERROR"; + case S_ERROR_PRE: + return "S_ERROR_PRE"; + case S_GENERATED_KEYS: return "S_GENERATED_KEYS"; @@ -2839,6 +2842,35 @@ return true; } +/** + * Shut down an SSL session, so an SSL close notify is sent if there no ot= her + * SSL notify. + * @param ks + */ +void +do_ssl_shutdown(struct key_state *ks) +{ +} + + +static bool +check_outgoing_ciphertext(struct key_state *ks, struct tls_session *sessio= n, + bool *state_change) +{ + /* Outgoing Ciphertext to reliable buffer */ + if (ks->state >=3D S_PRE_START) + { + struct buffer *buf =3D reliable_get_buf_output_sequenced(ks->send_= reliable); + if (buf) + { + if (!write_outgoing_tls_ciphertext(session, state_change)) + { + return false; + } + } + } + return true; +} static bool tls_process_state(struct tls_multi *multi, @@ -2912,6 +2944,16 @@ return false; } + if (ks->state =3D=3D S_ERROR_PRE) + { + /* When we end up here, we had one last chance to send an outstand= ing + * packet that contained an alert. We do not ensure that this pack= et + * has been successfully delivered (ie wait for the ACK etc) + * but rather stop processing now */ + ks->state =3D S_ERROR; + return false; + } + /* Write incoming ciphertext to TLS object */ struct reliable_entry *entry =3D reliable_get_entry_sequenced(ks->rec_= reliable); if (entry) @@ -2992,29 +3034,31 @@ dmsg(D_TLS_DEBUG, "Outgoing Plaintext -> TLS"); } } - - /* Outgoing Ciphertext to reliable buffer */ - if (ks->state >=3D S_START) + if (!check_outgoing_ciphertext(ks, session, &state_change)) { - buf =3D reliable_get_buf_output_sequenced(ks->send_reliable); - if (buf) - { - if (!write_outgoing_tls_ciphertext(session, &state_change)) - { - goto error; - } - } + goto error; } return state_change; error: tls_clear_error(); - ks->state =3D S_ERROR; + + /* Shut down the TLS session but do a last read from the TLS + * object to be able to read potential TLS alerts */ + do_ssl_shutdown(ks); + check_outgoing_ciphertext(ks, session, &continue_tls_process); + + /* Put ourselves in the pre error state that will only send out the + * control channel packets but nothing else */ + ks->state =3D S_ERROR_PRE; + msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: TLS handshake failed"); INCR_ERROR; - return false; - + return true; } + + + /* * This is the primary routine for processing TLS stuff inside the * the main event loop. When this routine exits @@ -3122,7 +3166,7 @@ } /* When should we wake up again? */ - if (ks->state >=3D S_INITIAL) + if (ks->state >=3D S_INITIAL || ks->state =3D=3D S_ERROR_PRE) { compute_earliest_wakeup(wakeup, reliable_send_timeout(ks->send_reliable)); @@ -3275,7 +3319,7 @@ session_id_print(&ks->session_id_remote, &gc), print_link_socket_actual(&ks->remote_addr, &gc)); - if (ks->state >=3D S_INITIAL && link_socket_actual_defined(&ks->re= mote_addr)) + if ((ks->state >=3D S_INITIAL || ks->state =3D=3D S_ERROR_PRE) && = link_socket_actual_defined(&ks->remote_addr)) { struct link_socket_actual *tla =3D NULL; @@ -3353,7 +3397,8 @@ { msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: generate_key_expansion faile= d"); ks->authenticated =3D KS_AUTH_FALSE; - ks->state =3D S_ERROR; + do_ssl_shutdown(ks); + ks->state =3D S_ERROR_PRE; } /* Update auth token on the client if needed on renegotiation diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h b/src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h index 3854d59..ea31902 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h @@ -372,6 +372,13 @@ const struct tls_root_ctx *ssl_ctx, bool is_server= , struct tls_session *session); /** + * Sets a TLS session to be shutdown state, so the TLS library will genera= te + * a shutdown altert. + */ +void +key_state_ssl_shutdown(struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl); + +/** * Free the SSL channel part of the given key state. * * @param ks_ssl The SSL channel's state info to free diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_common.h b/src/openvpn/ssl_common.h index d3edc5f..d38d8ec 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/ssl_common.h +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_common.h @@ -74,7 +74,10 @@ * * @{ */ -#define S_ERROR -1 /**< Error state. */ +#define S_ERROR (-2) /**< Error state. */ +#define S_ERROR_PRE (-1) /**< Error state but try to send out aler= ts + * before killing the keystore and moving + * it to S_ERROR */ #define S_UNDEF 0 /**< Undefined state, used after a \c * key_state is cleaned up. */ #define S_INITIAL 1 /**< Initial \c key_state state after diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c index 9c9167d..c8aca4f 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c @@ -1275,6 +1275,14 @@ ssl_bio_read, NULL); } =20 + +void +key_state_ssl_shutdown(struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl) +{ + mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ks_ssl->ctx, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FA= TAL, + MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY); +} + void key_state_ssl_free(struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl) { diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c index 82872bf..622b9b5 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c @@ -1961,6 +1961,12 @@ } void +key_state_ssl_shutdown(struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl) +{ + SSL_set_shutdown(ks_ssl->ssl, SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOW= N); +} + +void key_state_ssl_free(struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl) { if (ks_ssl->ssl) -- To view, visit http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/449?usp=3Demail To unsubscribe, or for help writing mail filters, visit http://gerrit.openv= pn.net/settings Gerrit-Project: openvpn Gerrit-Branch: master Gerrit-Change-Id: I0ad48915004ddee587e97c8ed190ba8ee989e48d Gerrit-Change-Number: 449 Gerrit-PatchSet: 1 Gerrit-Owner: plaisthos Gerrit-Reviewer: flichtenheld Gerrit-CC: openvpn-devel Gerrit-Attention: flichtenheld Gerrit-MessageType: newchange --fJbyPSL9e/c= Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Attention is currently required from: flichtenheld.

plaisthos would like flichtenheld to review this change.

Vi= ew Change

Allow the TLS session to send out TLS alerts

Previous = OpenVPN versions shut down the TLS control channel immediately
when enco= untering an error. This also meant that we would not send out
TLS alerts= to notify a client about potential problems like mismatching
TLS versio= ns or having no common cipher.

This commit adds a new key_state S_ER= ROR_PRE which still allows to
send out the remaining TLS packets of the = control session which are
typically the alert message and then going to = S_ERROR. We do not
wait for retries. So this is more a one-shot notify b= ut that is
acceptable in this situation.

Sending out alerts is a= slight compromise in security as alerts give
out a bit of information t= hat otherwise is not given
out. But since all other consumers TLS implem= entation are already doing this
and TLS implementation (nowadays) are ve= ry careful not to leak (sensitive)
information by alerts and since the u= ser experience is much better with
alerts, this compromise is worth it.<= br>
Change-Id: I0ad48915004ddee587e97c8ed190ba8ee989e48d
---
M Cha= nges.rst
M src/openvpn/ssl.c
M src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h
M src/ope= nvpn/ssl_common.h
M src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c
M src/openvpn/ssl_opens= sl.c
6 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

git pu= ll ssh://gerrit.openvpn.net:29418/openvpn refs/changes/49/449/1
dif=
f --git a/Changes.rst b/Changes.rst
index 3676dce..4c8be39 = 100644
--- a/Changes.rst
+++ b/Changes.rst<= /span>
@@ -1,5 +1,16 @@
Overview of changes in 2.= 7
=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D= =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D
+New features
+--= ----------
+TLS alert= s
+ OpenVPN 2.7 wi= ll send out TLS alerts to peer informing them if the TLS
+ session shuts down or when the TLS= implementation informs the peer about
+ an error in the TLS session (e.g. mismatching TLS ve= rsions). This improves
+ a timeout w= hen the server just stop responding completely.
+
+Deprecated features
+-------------------
``secret`` support has been r= emoved by default.
static key mode (non-TLS) is no lon= ger considered "good and secure enough"
for = today's requirements. Use TLS mode instead. If deploying a PKI CA
diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl.c b/src/openvpn/ssl.c
<= span>index b4cd8f5..16d3d22 100644

--- a/src/openvpn/ssl.c<= /span>
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl.c
@@ -853,6 +853,9 @@=
case S_ERROR:
return= "S_ERROR";

+ case S_ERROR_PRE:
+ return "S_ERROR_PRE";
+
= case S_GENERATED_KEYS:
return "S_GENERAT= ED_KEYS";

@@ -2839,6 +2842,35 @@
return true;
}
<= br>+/**
+ * Shut down an SSL session, so an SSL cl= ose notify is sent if there no other
+ * SSL notify.
+ * @param ks
+ */
+void=
+do_ssl_shutdown(struct key= _state *ks)
+{=
+}
+
+
+static = bool
+check_outgoing_= ciphertext(struct key_state *ks, struct tls_session *session,
+ bool *s= tate_change)

+{
+ /* Outgoing Ciphertex= t to reliable buffer */
+ if (ks->state >=3D S_PRE_START)
+ {
+ struct buffer *buf =3D reliable_get_buf_output_sequence= d(ks->send_reliable);
+ if (buf)
+ {
+ = if (!write_outgoing_tls_ciphertext(session, state_change))
+ {

+ return false;+ }
+ }

+ }
+ return true;
+}

static bool
tls_process_state(struct tls_multi *multi,

@@ -2912,6 = +2944,16 @@
return false;
}

+ = if (ks->state =3D=3D S_ERROR_PRE)
+ {
+ /* When we end up here, we had one last chance to send an outst= anding
+ * pa= cket that contained an alert. We do not ensure that this packet
<= span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ * has been successfull= y delivered (ie wait for the ACK etc)

+ * but rather stop processing now */
<= span style=3D"color: hsl(120, 100%, 40%);">+ ks->state =3D S_ERRO= R;

+ return fa= lse;
+ }+
/* Writ= e incoming ciphertext to TLS object */
struct reliable= _entry *entry =3D reliable_get_entry_sequenced(ks->rec_reliable);=
if (entry)
@@ -2992,29 +3034,31 @@ dmsg(D_TLS_DEBUG, "Outgoing Plaintext -> TLS&qu= ot;);
}
}
-
- /* Outgoing Ciphertext to reliable buffer */
- if (ks->state >=3D S_STAR= T)
+ if (!check_ou= tgoing_ciphertext(ks, session, &state_change))
{
- buf =3D reliabl= e_get_buf_output_sequenced(ks->send_reliable);
- if (buf)
- {
- if (!write_outgoing_tls_ciphertext(session, &sta= te_change))
- = {
- go= to error;
- = }
- }
= + goto error;
= }

return state_change;
error:
tls_clear_error();
- ks->state =3D S_ERROR;
+
+ /* Shut down the TLS session but do a la= st read from the TLS
= + * object to be able to read potential TLS alerts */
+ do_ssl_shutdown(ks);
+ check_outgoing_ciphertext(ks= , session, &continue_tls_process);

+
+= /* Put ourselves in the pre error state that will only send out the

+ * control channel = packets but nothing else */
+ ks->state =3D S_ERROR_PRE;
+
msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Err= or: TLS handshake failed");
INCR_ERROR;- return false;
-
+ return true;
}
+
+
+<= /span>
/*
* This is the primary routine for pro= cessing TLS stuff inside the
* the main event loop. When= this routine exits
@@ -3122,7 +3166,7 @@
= }

/* When should we wake up agai= n? */
- if (ks->s= tate >=3D S_INITIAL)
+ if (ks->state >=3D S_INITIAL || ks->state =3D=3D S_ERROR_P= RE)
{
compute_earliest_wakeup= (wakeup,
reliable_send_tim= eout(ks->send_reliable));
@@ -3275,7 +3319,7 @@ session_id_print(&ks->session_id_remote, &= gc),
print_link_socket_actual(&ks->rem= ote_addr, &gc));

- if (ks->state >=3D S_INITIAL && link= _socket_actual_defined(&ks->remote_addr))
+ if ((ks->state >=3D S_INITIAL ||= ks->state =3D=3D S_ERROR_PRE) && link_socket_actual_defined(&a= mp;ks->remote_addr))
{
= struct link_socket_actual *tla =3D NULL;

<= span>@@ -3353,7 +3397,8 @@

{
= msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: generate_key_expansion f= ailed");
ks->authenticated =3D KS_= AUTH_FALSE;
- = ks->state =3D S_ERROR;
+ do_ssl_shutdown(ks);
+ ks->state =3D S_ERROR_PRE;<= /span>
}

= /* Update auth token on the client if needed on renegotiation
= diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h b/src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h
index 3854d59..ea31902 100644
--- a/src/openv= pn/ssl_backend.h
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h
= @@ -372,6 +372,13 @@
const s= truct tls_root_ctx *ssl_ctx, bool is_server, struct tls_session *session);<= /span>

/**
+ * Sets a TLS session to be shutdown state, so the TLS l= ibrary will generate
= + * a shutdown altert.
+void+key_state_ssl_shutdown(struc= t key_state_ssl *ks_ssl);
+
+/** * Free the SSL channel part of the given key state.
*

* @param ks_ssl The SSL channel's state = info to free
diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_common.h b/src/op= envpn/ssl_common.h
index d3edc5f..d38d8ec 100644
= --- a/src/openvpn/ssl_common.h
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_= common.h
@@ -74,7 +74,10 @@
*
<= span> * @{

*/
-#define S_ERROR -1 /**< Error state. */<= br>+#define S_ERROR (-2= ) /**< Error state. */
+#define S_ERROR_PRE (-1) /**< Error state but try to = send out alerts
+ = * before killing the keystore and moving

+ = * it to S_ERROR */
#define S_UNDEF 0= /**< Undefined state, used after a \c
= * key_state is cleaned up. */
#defi= ne S_INITIAL 1 /**< Initial \c key_state state after<= br>diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c=
index 9c9167d..c8aca4f 100644
--- a/src/op= envpn/ssl_mbedtls.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c<= br>@@ -1275,6 +1275,14 @@
ss= l_bio_read, NULL);
}

+
+void
+key_state_ssl_shutdown(struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl)
+{
+ mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(ks_ssl->ctx, MBEDTLS= _SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
+ MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY);=
+}
+
void
key_state_ssl_free(struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl)
{

diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_openss= l.c
index 82872bf..622b9b5 100644
--- a/src= /openvpn/ssl_openssl.c
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c
@@ -1961,6 +1961,12 @@
}

void
+k= ey_state_ssl_shutdown(struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl)
+{
+ SSL_set_shutdown(ks_ssl->ssl, SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SS= L_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN);
+}
+
+void

key_state_ssl= _free(struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl)
{
= if (ks_ssl->ssl)

To view, visit change 449. To unsubscribe, or for help writing mail filters, visit settings.

Gerrit-Project: openvpn
Gerrit-Branch: master
Gerrit-Change-Id: I0ad48915004ddee587e97c8ed19= 0ba8ee989e48d
Gerrit-Change-Number: 449
Gerrit-PatchSet: 1
Gerrit-Owner: plaisthos <arne-openvpn@...1711...= 27...>
Gerrit-Reviewer: flichtenheld <frank@...2716...= 1...>
Gerrit-CC: openvpn-devel <openvpn-devel@...1484...= ts.sourceforge.net>
Gerrit-Attention: flichtenheld <frank@...2375...= 41...>
Gerrit-MessageType: newchange
--fJbyPSL9e/c=--