Received: from jazzswing.ncsc.mil (jazzswing.ncsc.mil [144.51.68.65]) by tycho.ncsc.mil (8.9.3/8.9.3) with ESMTP id WAA17759 for ; Wed, 31 Jul 2002 22:39:58 -0400 (EDT) Received: from jazzswing.ncsc.mil (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by jazzswing.ncsc.mil with ESMTP id CAA19329 for ; Thu, 1 Aug 2002 02:39:07 GMT Received: from snoopy.apana.org.au (snoopy.apana.org.au [203.12.237.97]) by jazzswing.ncsc.mil with ESMTP id CAA19325 for ; Thu, 1 Aug 2002 02:39:05 GMT Date: Thu, 1 Aug 2002 12:39:43 +1000 From: Brian May To: SE Linux Subject: Re: sshd mods Message-ID: <20020801023943.GA23655@snoopy.apana.org.au> References: <20020731165519.087D01FC@lyta.coker.com.au> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii In-Reply-To: <20020731165519.087D01FC@lyta.coker.com.au> Sender: owner-selinux@tycho.nsa.gov List-Id: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov On Wed, Jul 31, 2002 at 06:55:18PM +0200, Russell Coker wrote: > I think that we could probably benefit from a wrapper program that ssh would > run. This wrapper would perhaps have a configuration method somewhat similar > to sudo to determine what programs ssh could run and what parameters can be > passed to them. Then we could deny sshd access to change domain/role and > only allow this wrapper to do that, then sshd would only be able to execute > the wrapper (and hopefully the vast majority of ssh exploits would then be > unable to affect us). It sounds very much like a compromise between useability and security here. For instance, I might really want to login to a remote box and run rm. I might even want to do this as a non-interactive command. In fact, my scripts I use to download BSTMP (batched SMTP) from the Debian server do just this: ssh -l$USER $HOST bin/downloadmail rsync -essh -avz --progress $USER@$HOST:download/ $HOME/download shopt -s nullglob for i in * do /usr/sbin/rbsmtp < $i rm $i ssh -l$USER $HOST rm -f download/$i done A better long term solution might be to somehow require the remote host has a SPKI key or something (a public key can already be used to limit what commands the remote host can execute, but that doesn't work if sshd has been compromised) that somehow can be used to limit what domains sshd can run. However, I have not put any thought into if this is possible, practical or feasible. -- Brian May -- You have received this message because you are subscribed to the selinux list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.