Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" From: Bill Laut To: Tracy R Reed Subject: Re: SELinux, KDE, and honeypots Date: Thu, 10 Jul 2003 03:25:00 -0400 Cc: SELinux@tycho.nsa.gov References: <200307082303.22083.wlsel@verizon.net> <20030709154140.B28893@ultraviolet.org> In-Reply-To: <20030709154140.B28893@ultraviolet.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Message-Id: <200307100325.00769.wlsel@verizon.net> Sender: owner-selinux@tycho.nsa.gov List-Id: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov On Wednesday 09 July 2003 06:41 pm, Tracy R Reed wrote: > On Tue, Jul 08, 2003 at 11:03:22PM -0400, Bill Laut spake thusly: > > needs to be modified is kdm. Is this a correct assumption, or should I > > expect it to be more involved than that? > > rjc has already offered a good answer to this. kdm isn't easily patched, > use something else or startx. > I appreciate what you're saying, but if I had to go the startx route it will be a burr under my saddle until I finally get kdm patched. Maybe if I bloody my head from banging against it long enough, I'll think otherwise.... > > > The idea I had was to create a pseudo-device driver that leverages > > NetFilter to output all traffic from all TCP streams to a user-mode > > daemon that writes the packets for each stream into their own separate > > disk files (and governing > > I think this is a pretty slick idea. Although I doubt you have to make it > as fancy as a device driver. I would log everything to an external host > and let that external host also do the sniffing. It could save everything > for a certain amount of time before deleting it (I might go for a week > since this box shouldn't get much traffic and gentle probes can be made > over a long period of time before they pick your box as a target or > discover a vulnerability that will allow them to cause an access > violation) and if there was an access violation it could permanently save > all traffic up to that point and any future traffic of any ip that had > communicated with the box within a minute before and after the violation > occurred. Pretty much all of the vulnerabilities I am aware of cause > instantaneous results but if there are some that might cause a time delay > between the network traffic and the access violation the window can be > widened to an hour or a day or whatever. It just means we'll have more > data to go through but this box should not be receiving much traffic > anyhow. > Yes, I agree wth everything you said. One of the contingencies I'm anticipating is something I call (for lack of a better term) a "refractive vector." This is where the attacker slowly, carefully, methodically "cases" the target, ever so gently probing here and there, while installing the payload piece by piece while looking for a way in, but constantly vigilant to see if they've been detected. Analyzing such refractive vectors can border on thaumatology--especially if they've been artfully hidden in deliberately-manufactured "background noise." This is where large disk drives are a blessing, so that the necessary data are not lost over time--which can be one of the attacker's goals. > > Oh, and of course you would want to run the box in permissive mode for all > of this so that their exploit can actually work and you can learn > something. > Exactly. This is the essence of my tangential labelling this abstraction as a honeypot, although if I were professional about it I would scrub all identifiable features so that the attacker couldn't fingerprint it as an SELinux-based box. No sense setting a trap if the perp can detect it. > > > Does this idea sound reasonable? Has someone already done it using > > SELinux? If not, how would you improve it? > > I am not aware of anyone having done it either. Kinda wish I had thought > of it actually. :) My suggestions for improvement are above. Sounds like a > very interesting project. > Thank you. -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.