Received: from zombie.ncsc.mil (zombie.ncsc.mil [144.51.88.131]) by tycho.ncsc.mil (8.12.8/8.12.8) with ESMTP id i87ExKrT026895 for ; Tue, 7 Sep 2004 10:59:21 -0400 (EDT) Received: from moss-huskies.epoch.ncsc.mil (jazzdrum.ncsc.mil [144.51.5.7]) by zombie.ncsc.mil (8.12.10/8.12.10) with ESMTP id i87ExJll013594 for ; Tue, 7 Sep 2004 14:59:19 GMT Received: from moss-huskies.epoch.ncsc.mil (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by moss-huskies.epoch.ncsc.mil (8.12.11/8.12.11) with ESMTP id i87Exw0c005601 for ; Tue, 7 Sep 2004 10:59:58 -0400 Received: (from hdholm@localhost) by moss-huskies.epoch.ncsc.mil (8.12.11/8.12.11/Submit) id i87Exw2G005600 for selinux@tycho.nsa.gov; Tue, 7 Sep 2004 10:59:58 -0400 From: Russell Coker Reply-To: russell@coker.com.au To: fedora-selinux-list@redhat.com Subject: Re: [OT] SELinux vs. other systems [was Re: [idea] udev + selinux] Date: Sat, 4 Sep 2004 18:49:09 +1000 Cc: Linas Vepstas , Nigel Kukard , SELinux References: <20040830173744.GD10151@lbsd.net> <200409022215.20830.russell@coker.com.au> <20040902170734.GA9645@austin.ibm.com> In-Reply-To: <20040902170734.GA9645@austin.ibm.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Message-Id: <200409041849.09954.russell@coker.com.au> Sender: owner-selinux@tycho.nsa.gov List-Id: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov On Fri, 3 Sep 2004 03:07, Linas Vepstas wrote: > Well, here's another idle question, again off-topic: Does SELinux provide > any sort of assurances that storage media weren't tampered with between > reboots? No, that is outside the scope of the SE Linux project. I am one of the many people in Red Hat who are involved in working on crypto block device support. One of my own systems has a root file system that is AES encrypted with the kernel and initrd (which includes the decryption key) on removable media. Eventually I want to see this become a standard feature of Fedora, maybe in FC4. I think it will address most of what you want in this regard. Note that the NSA guys do not talk to me about any security stuff, so I don't expect them to have any involvement in such things. > For example, with BIOS/firmware getting more sophisticated over time, > there's potential for an attacker to break in, remotely, into > bios/firmware, shortly before booting into the OS, and then alter > disk contents. Yes, I know this is far-fetched, but was just curious. When booting from removable media that contains the decryption key the attack scenario would be to replace the BIOS with one that sends everything it reads from disk (IE everything that the boot loader reads) over an Ethernet interface. A trojan BIOS that modifies the kernel during the boot load process to introduce a security hole would be doable if you have adequate resources. -- http://www.coker.com.au/selinux/ My NSA Security Enhanced Linux packages http://www.coker.com.au/bonnie++/ Bonnie++ hard drive benchmark http://www.coker.com.au/postal/ Postal SMTP/POP benchmark http://www.coker.com.au/~russell/ My home page -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.