Received: from jazzhorn.ncsc.mil (mummy.ncsc.mil [144.51.88.129]) by tycho.ncsc.mil (8.12.8/8.12.8) with ESMTP id k0AMc9Xf018105 for ; Tue, 10 Jan 2006 17:38:10 -0500 (EST) Received: from web51501.mail.yahoo.com (jazzhorn.ncsc.mil [144.51.5.9]) by jazzhorn.ncsc.mil (8.12.10/8.12.10) with SMTP id k0AMb4Il014215 for ; Tue, 10 Jan 2006 22:37:04 GMT Message-ID: <20060110223808.66858.qmail@web51501.mail.yahoo.com> Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2006 14:38:08 -0800 (PST) From: Steve G Subject: [PATCH] newrole cleanup To: SE-Linux MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="0-1615797696-1136932688=:65249" Sender: owner-selinux@tycho.nsa.gov List-Id: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov --0-1615797696-1136932688=:65249 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Id: Content-Disposition: inline Hi, I've been reviewing newrole in preparation for another patch to add auditing to it. The patch is fairly self-explanatory. Some highlights: - little const cleanup - pass tty to pam - add a function to verify the shell is in fact known to /etc/shells - make sure no signals are blocked - If in enforcing mode and error: getting tty context, computing new context, or setting new context then exit with -1. - Loop the wait call to handle EINTR - open the tty read only or write only depending on stdin, stdout, stderr. - pass return from pam_* functions to pam_end The patch is attached. -Steve __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around http://mail.yahoo.com --0-1615797696-1136932688=:65249 Content-Type: text/x-patch; name="policycoreutils-1.29.5-newrole-cleanup.patch" Content-Description: 4054889167-policycoreutils-1.29.5-newrole-cleanup.patch Content-Disposition: inline; filename="policycoreutils-1.29.5-newrole-cleanup.patch" diff -ur policycoreutils-1.29.5.orig/newrole/newrole.c policycoreutils-1.29.5/newrole/newrole.c --- policycoreutils-1.29.5.orig/newrole/newrole.c 2006-01-10 16:21:20.000000000 -0500 +++ policycoreutils-1.29.5/newrole/newrole.c 2006-01-10 17:31:05.000000000 -0500 @@ -93,7 +93,8 @@ static char * build_new_range(char *newlevel, const char *range) { - char *newrangep = NULL, *tmpptr; + char *newrangep = NULL; + const char *tmpptr; size_t len; /* a missing or empty string */ @@ -147,7 +148,7 @@ #define SERVICE_NAME "newrole" /* the name of this program for PAM */ -int authenticate_via_pam( const struct passwd * ); +int authenticate_via_pam( const struct passwd *, const char * ); /* authenticate_via_pam() * @@ -165,10 +166,12 @@ * */ -int authenticate_via_pam( const struct passwd *pw ) { +int authenticate_via_pam( const struct passwd *pw, const char *ttyn ) { int result = 0; /* our result, set to 0 (not authenticated) by default */ + int rc; /* pam return code */ pam_handle_t *pam_handle; /* opaque handle used by all PAM functions */ + const char *tty_name; /* This is a jump table of functions for PAM to use when it wants to * * communicate with the user. We'll be using misc_conv(), which is * @@ -180,26 +183,41 @@ /* Make `p_pam_handle' a valid PAM handle so we can use it when * * calling PAM functions. */ - if( PAM_SUCCESS != pam_start( SERVICE_NAME, - pw->pw_name, - &pam_conversation, - &pam_handle ) ) { + rc = pam_start( SERVICE_NAME, + pw->pw_name, + &pam_conversation, + &pam_handle ); + if( rc != PAM_SUCCESS ) { fprintf( stderr, _("failed to initialize PAM\n") ); exit( -1 ); } + if( strncmp(ttyn, "/dev/", 5) == 0 ) + tty_name = ttyn+5; + else + tty_name = ttyn; + + rc = pam_set_item( pam_handle, PAM_TTY, tty_name ); + if( rc != PAM_SUCCESS ) { + fprintf( stderr, _("failed to set PAM_TTY\n") ); + goto out; + } + /* Ask PAM to authenticate the user running this program */ - if( PAM_SUCCESS == pam_authenticate(pam_handle,0) ) { - result = 1; /* user authenticated OK! */ + rc = pam_authenticate(pam_handle,0); + if( rc != PAM_SUCCESS ) { + goto out; } /* Ask PAM to verify acct_mgmt */ - if( PAM_SUCCESS != pam_acct_mgmt(pam_handle,0) ) { - result = 0; - } + rc = pam_acct_mgmt(pam_handle,0); + if( rc == PAM_SUCCESS ) { + result = 1; /* user authenticated OK! */ + } /* We're done with PAM. Free `pam_handle'. */ - pam_end( pam_handle, PAM_SUCCESS ); +out: + pam_end( pam_handle, rc ); return( result ); @@ -277,6 +295,33 @@ #endif /* if/else USE_PAM */ +/* + * This function checks to see if the shell is known in /etc/shells. + * If so, it returns 1. On error or illegal shell, it returns 0. + */ +static int verify_shell(const char *shell_name) +{ + int found = 0; + const char *buf; + + if( !shell_name ) + return found; + + while( (buf = getusershell()) != NULL ) { + /* ignore comments */ + if( *buf == '#' ) + continue; + + /* check the shell skipping newline char */ + if( ! strcmp (shell_name, buf) ) { + found = 1; + break; + } + } + endusershell(); + return found; +} + /************************************************************************ * * All code used for both PAM and shadow passwd goes in this section. @@ -285,13 +330,13 @@ int main( int argc, char *argv[] ) { - security_context_t new_context=NULL; /* our target security context */ + security_context_t new_context=NULL; /* our target security context */ security_context_t old_context=NULL; /* our original securiy context */ security_context_t tty_context=NULL; /* The current context of tty file */ - security_context_t new_tty_context=NULL; /* The new context of tty file */ + security_context_t new_tty_context=NULL; /* The new context of tty file */ security_context_t chk_tty_context= NULL; - context_t context; /* manipulatable form of new_context */ + context_t context; /* manipulatable form of new_context */ const char *se_username; /* SELinux user identity */ @@ -300,7 +345,7 @@ int clflag; /* holds codes for command line flags */ int flag_index; /* flag index in argv[] */ - struct option long_options[] = { /* long option flags for getopt() */ + const struct option long_options[] = { /* long option flags for getopt() */ { "role", 1, 0, 'r' }, { "type", 1, 0, 't' }, { "level", 1, 0, 'l' }, @@ -311,7 +356,13 @@ char *level_s = NULL; /* level spec'd by user in argv[] */ char *ttyn = NULL; /* tty path */ pid_t childPid=0; - int fd=0; + int fd; + int enforcing; + sigset_t empty; + + /* Empty the signal mask in case someone is blocking a signal */ + sigemptyset( &empty ); + (void) sigprocmask( SIG_SETMASK, &empty, NULL ); /* Terminate on SIGHUP. */ signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL); @@ -334,6 +385,11 @@ _("Sorry, newrole may be used only on a SELinux kernel.\n") ); exit(-1); } + enforcing = security_getenforce(); + if (enforcing < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, _("Could not determine enforcing mode.\n")); + exit(-1); + } while (1) { clflag=getopt_long(argc,argv,"r:t:l:",long_options,&flag_index); @@ -452,11 +508,23 @@ pw->pw_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir); pw->pw_shell = xstrdup(pw->pw_shell); + if (verify_shell(pw->pw_shell) == 0) { + fprintf(stderr, _("Error! Shell is not valid.\n")); + exit(-1); + } + + /* Get the tty name. Pam will need it. */ + ttyn=ttyname(0); + if (!ttyn || *ttyn == '\0') { + fprintf(stderr, _("Error! Could not retrieve tty information.\n")); + exit(-1); + } + printf(_("Authenticating %s.\n"),pw->pw_name); /* Authenticate the user running this program. */ #ifdef USE_PAM - if( !authenticate_via_pam(pw) ) + if( !authenticate_via_pam(pw, ttyn) ) #else /* !USE_PAM */ if( !authenticate_via_shadow_passwd(pw) ) #endif /* if/else USE_PAM */ @@ -548,31 +616,30 @@ * */ - /* Fetch TTY information */ - ttyn=ttyname(0); - if (!ttyn || *ttyn == '\0') { - fprintf(stderr, _("Warning! Could not retrieve tty information.\n")); - exit(-1); - } - + /* Re-open TTY descriptor */ fd = open(ttyn, O_RDWR); if (fd < 0) { - fprintf(stderr, _("Warning! Could not open %s.\n"), ttyn); + fprintf(stderr, _("Error! Could not open %s.\n"), ttyn); exit(-1); } tty_context = NULL; - if (fgetfilecon(fd, &tty_context) < 0) - fprintf(stderr, _("Warning! Could not get current context for %s, not relabeling.\n"), ttyn); - + if (fgetfilecon(fd, &tty_context) < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, _("%s! Could not get current context for %s, not relabeling tty.\n"), enforcing ? "Error" : "Warning", ttyn); + if (enforcing) + exit(-1); + } #ifdef CANTSPELLGDB if (tty_context) printf("Your tty %s was labeled with context %s\n", ttyn, tty_context); #endif new_tty_context = NULL; - if (tty_context && (security_compute_relabel(new_context,tty_context,SECCLASS_CHR_FILE,&new_tty_context) < 0)) - fprintf(stderr, _("Warning! Could not get new context for %s, not relabeling.\n"), ttyn); + if (tty_context && (security_compute_relabel(new_context,tty_context,SECCLASS_CHR_FILE,&new_tty_context) < 0)) { + fprintf(stderr, _("Error! Could not get new context for %s, not relabeling tty.\n"), ttyn); + if (enforcing) + exit(-1); + } #ifdef CANTSPELLGDB if (new_tty_context) @@ -581,9 +648,11 @@ if (new_tty_context) { if (fsetfilecon(fd,new_tty_context) < 0) { - fprintf(stderr, _("Warning! Could not set new context for %s\n"), ttyn); + fprintf(stderr, _("%s! Could not set new context for %s\n"), enforcing ? "Error" : "Warning", ttyn); freecon(new_tty_context); new_tty_context = NULL; + if (enforcing) + exit(-1); } } @@ -592,12 +661,18 @@ if( childPid<0 ) { int errsv=errno; fprintf(stderr,_("newrole: failure forking: %s"),strerror(errsv)); + if (fsetfilecon(fd,tty_context) < 0) + fprintf(stderr, _("Warning! Could not restore context for %s\n"), ttyn); + freecon(tty_context); exit(-1); } else if (childPid) { /* PARENT */ - wait(NULL); + int rc; + do { + rc = wait(NULL); + } while (rc < 0 && errno == EINTR); - if (!new_tty_context) + if (!new_tty_context||!tty_context) exit(0); /* Verify that the tty still has the context set by newrole. */ @@ -634,15 +709,15 @@ fprintf(stderr,_("Could not close descriptors.\n")); exit(-1); } - fd = open(ttyn,O_RDWR); + fd = open(ttyn,O_RDONLY); if (fd != 0) { exit(-1); } - fd = open(ttyn,O_RDWR); + fd = open(ttyn,O_WRONLY); if (fd != 1) { exit(-1); } - fd = open(ttyn,O_RDWR); + fd = open(ttyn,O_WRONLY); if (fd != 2) { exit(-1); } --0-1615797696-1136932688=:65249-- -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.