From: Russell Coker Reply-To: russell@coker.com.au To: Stephen Smalley Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] newrole suid breakdown Date: Sat, 7 Oct 2006 01:16:34 +1000 Cc: Steve Grubb , Michael C Thompson , Daniel J Walsh , SE Linux , jdesai@us.ibm.com References: <452432FA.1060009@us.ibm.com> <200610051748.06669.sgrubb@redhat.com> <1160146343.12253.85.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> In-Reply-To: <1160146343.12253.85.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Message-Id: <200610070116.39485.russell@coker.com.au> Sender: owner-selinux@tycho.nsa.gov List-Id: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov On Saturday 07 October 2006 00:52, Stephen Smalley wrote: > Russell had alternatively suggested moving newrole into its own package > and only installing it (always suid) if installing a -strict or -mls > policy (i.e. make it a dependency of those policy packages), so that a > default install does not include it at all (as -targeted has no need for > newrole functionality).   Concerns there might include: a) mere > installation of -strict or -mls on a system does not mean that they are > the active policy, so one could still end up with the suid newrole on a > machine running targeted, b) not all users of -strict necessarily want > pam_namespace functionality.   Also not sure about whether that poses > any packaging or dependency issues. You are correct that if my suggestion is followed then a very small portion of the machines running targeted policy or without SE Linux will have newrole installed setuid-root. But let's put things in perspective. A typical install of Fedora has about 30 setuid-root programs (mine has 36). The same typical Fedora install can be expected to have some setgid programs that give access to important groups and some possible indirect chains of execution that lead from non-root to root. Of those programs many of them are of old implementation or old design, for example when writing this message I realised that I had several setuid-root programs from the rsh package. I had never desired rsh to be installed, it must have either been dragged in by dependencies or be part of a default install. Also there are a number of daemons that run as root (dhclient and cups are on most workstations). I agree that we don't want to reduce security through making a mistake, but there are plenty of better avenues of attack than newrole. It might be a better use of our time to just accept that a few people will have a setuid-root copy of newrole installed when they don't need it and save our time for other things. After all most Fedora users get a kerberos version of su installed when they don't need it. -- russell@coker.com.au http://etbe.blogspot.com/ My Blog http://www.coker.com.au/sponsorship.html Sponsoring Free Software development -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.