From: Russell Coker Reply-To: russell@coker.com.au To: Stephen Smalley Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] newrole suid breakdown Date: Sat, 7 Oct 2006 05:03:40 +1000 Cc: Daniel J Walsh , Michael C Thompson , SE Linux , jdesai@us.ibm.com References: <452432FA.1060009@us.ibm.com> <200610070337.40031.russell@coker.com.au> <1160160879.20202.38.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> In-Reply-To: <1160160879.20202.38.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Message-Id: <200610070503.44076.russell@coker.com.au> Sender: owner-selinux@tycho.nsa.gov List-Id: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov On Saturday 07 October 2006 04:54, Stephen Smalley wrote: > Not sure I follow. Dan just wants to be able to build a single newrole > binary that correctly handles both cases, and the default install to > leave newrole non-setuid. However the default install (being targeted policy) doesn't need newrole. > > Without even trying I've found six setuid-root programs that are included > > in a fairly default install of Fedora and which are never needed by the > > vast majority of users. I doubt that all six are as well audited as > > newrole. > > Keep in mind that newrole didn't start life as a setuid program, so it > wasn't written specifically from that perspective. It was even fairly > limited wrt SELinux - it couldn't transition you to an arbitrary role > and domain, only one that you were already authorized for in the kernel > policy (vs. su, which can serve as the gateway from any uid to any uid). > The only real power it had was access to the tty/ptys. Reasonable points. However when you compare it to rsh and rcp... -- russell@coker.com.au http://etbe.blogspot.com/ My Blog http://www.coker.com.au/sponsorship.html Sponsoring Free Software development -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.