From: Brendan Cully Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] Add support for OpenBSD Date: Wed, 18 Oct 2006 10:47:19 -0700 Message-ID: <20061018174719.GA15919@ventoux.cs.ubc.ca> References: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xensource.com Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xensource.com To: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com List-Id: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org On Wednesday, 18 October 2006 at 17:39, Keir Fraser wrote: > On 18/10/06 17:34, "Anil Madhavapeddy" wrote: > > >> We have that already in arch/x86/Rules.mk. If that was working, I > >> doubt > >> Christoph would have gone to the trouble of hacking up the SSP goop. > >> > > > > That flag definitely works. > > > > I think Christoph wanted to get stack protection working, as all the > > other OpenBSD bits (kernel/userland) use it. There isn't much to it > > beyond adding the stack smash handler, and the stack frame format > > changes a bit... > > I don't think stack-smashing attacks are a worrying vulnerability for Xen. > We don't do much variable-sized buffer manipulation, strcpy, and so on. I'd > much rather see someone put some effort into something more likely to be > useful (albeit undoubtedly more work!) like randomised attacks on the > hypercall interfaces. I built something to do that for a course project a few months ago - basically a kernel module to pass along completely unchecked hypercalls, generated by a python script with a few hooks to filter out those that it knew Xen would catch anyway. It even managed to crash xen periodically, but I never quite finished the piece that was supposed to reproduce crashes after they happened. I guess I should clean it up and post it somewhere...