From: Brendan Cully Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] Add support for OpenBSD Date: Wed, 18 Oct 2006 12:22:11 -0700 Message-ID: <20061018192211.GC15919@ventoux.cs.ubc.ca> References: <20061018174719.GA15919@ventoux.cs.ubc.ca> <3AAA99889D105740BE010EB6D5A5A3B20506CA@paddington.ad.cl.cam.ac.uk> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <3AAA99889D105740BE010EB6D5A5A3B20506CA@paddington.ad.cl.cam.ac.uk> List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xensource.com Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xensource.com To: Ian Pratt Cc: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com List-Id: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org On Wednesday, 18 October 2006 at 19:13, Ian Pratt wrote: > > > I don't think stack-smashing attacks are a worrying vulnerability > for > > Xen. > > > We don't do much variable-sized buffer manipulation, strcpy, and so > on. > > I'd > > > much rather see someone put some effort into something more likely > to be > > > useful (albeit undoubtedly more work!) like randomised attacks on > the > > > hypercall interfaces. > > > > I built something to do that for a course project a few months ago - > > basically a kernel module to pass along completely unchecked > > hypercalls, generated by a python script with a few hooks to filter > > out those that it knew Xen would catch anyway. It even managed to > > crash xen periodically, but I never quite finished the piece that was > > supposed to reproduce crashes after they happened. I guess I should > > clean it up and post it somewhere... > > That would certainly be helpful -- thanks! > I suspect you could get the most mileage with this by saving the domain, > then having a loop that restores it and kicks off the test with a > different seed. This should enable much faster cycling than having to > boot the VM every time Xen decides to terminate it for misbehaving. That's exactly what it did. > Many of the more complex situations come about by having complex > pagetable structures etc that are almost valid but have subtle bugs. > Generating these scenarios by hand is going to be tough. I think that > possibly fault injection is the best way of handling these, perhaps > having a special guest kernel module that runs off the ticker and tries > to do interesting corruptions to pagetables. We could also arrange to > corrupt hypercall arguments one time in a thousand or something. Yes, 'almost correct' is the hard part, and page table manipulation from userspace needs a bit more help than I ever put into my module. But I don't think it would be that much work to export them, let userspace fiddle with them a bit, and reload them. > It would be *great* if someone could work at this sort of testing. It > may not sexy as some of the other security work that's going on, but > would be incredibly valuable to the project. Please could someone step > forward! I don't know if I've got the time for it in the near term, but if anyone's interested, the code I wrote (such as it is) is available at http://hg.kublai.com/monkey