Received: from jazzhorn.ncsc.mil (mummy.ncsc.mil [144.51.88.129]) by tarius.tycho.ncsc.mil (8.13.1/8.13.1) with ESMTP id kA6HevU9005891 for ; Mon, 6 Nov 2006 12:40:57 -0500 Received: from localhost.localdomain (jazzhorn.ncsc.mil [144.51.5.9]) by jazzhorn.ncsc.mil (8.12.10/8.12.10) with ESMTP id kA6HeAiG011909 for ; Mon, 6 Nov 2006 17:40:11 GMT Message-Id: <20061106173814.457967976@tresys.com>> Date: Mon, 06 Nov 2006 12:38:14 -0500 From: Chad Sellers To: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov Subject: [PATCH 0/4] SELinux: Validate kernel object classes and permissions Sender: owner-selinux@tycho.nsa.gov List-Id: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov Resending updated patchset to address concerns of Steve and James. This replaces the object class and permission validation code in the SELinux security server. The current code validates that the object classes and permissions have not changed between policy loads. This requires a simple reboot to circumvent, and more importantly does not allow for any change in object classes or permissions upon reload (say if a new userspace object manager was added to the system). The new logic simply verifies the values of object classes and permissions against the kernel headers in security/selinux/include. If a class or permission in the new policy that is defined in the kernel headers does not match the kernel headers, then policy will fail to load. Note that there is no longer any comparison between the old policy and the new policy. Signed-off-by: Chad Sellers -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.