From: jjohansen@suse.de Subject: [RFD Patch 4/4] Pass nameidata2 to permission() from nfsd_permission() Date: Mon, 14 May 2007 04:06:54 -0700 Message-ID: <20070514110652.276911867@suse.de> References: <20070514110650.866217377@suse.de> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, Andreas Gruenbacher To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline; filename=nfsd_permission-nameidata.diff Sender: linux-security-module-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-fsdevel.vger.kernel.org Construct a nameidata object and pass it down to permission(), so that we can do the proper mount flag checks there. Note that confining nfsd with AppArmor makes no sense, and so this patch is not necessary for AppArmor alone. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher --- fs/nfsd/vfs.c | 9 +++++++-- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c @@ -1804,6 +1804,7 @@ nfsd_statfs(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, stru __be32 nfsd_permission(struct svc_export *exp, struct dentry *dentry, int acc) { + struct nameidata2 nd; struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; int err; @@ -1869,12 +1870,16 @@ nfsd_permission(struct svc_export *exp, inode->i_uid == current->fsuid) return 0; - err = permission(inode, acc & (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC), NULL); + nd.dentry = dentry; + nd.mnt = exp->ex_mnt; + nd.flags = LOOKUP_ACCESS; + + err = permission(inode, acc & (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC), &nd); /* Allow read access to binaries even when mode 111 */ if (err == -EACCES && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && acc == (MAY_READ | MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE)) - err = permission(inode, MAY_EXEC, NULL); + err = permission(inode, MAY_EXEC, &nd); return err? nfserrno(err) : 0; } --