From: Lars Marowsky-Bree Subject: Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching Date: Thu, 21 Jun 2007 22:21:07 +0200 Message-ID: <20070621202107.GM20105@marowsky-bree.de> References: <466C303E.5010304@novell.com> <20070615165054.GA11345@kroah.com> <20070615200623.GA2616@elf.ucw.cz> <20070615211157.GB7337@kroah.com> <46732124.80509@novell.com> <20070616000251.GG2616@elf.ucw.cz> <20070621160840.GA20105@marowsky-bree.de> <20070621183311.GC18990@elf.ucw.cz> <20070621192407.GF20105@marowsky-bree.de> <20070621200740.GG18990@elf.ucw.cz> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: QUOTED-PRINTABLE Cc: Crispin Cowan , Greg KH , Andreas Gruenbacher , Stephen Smalley , jjohansen@suse.de, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org To: Pavel Machek Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20070621200740.GG18990@elf.ucw.cz> Sender: linux-security-module-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-fsdevel.vger.kernel.org On 2007-06-21T22:07:40, Pavel Machek wrote: > > AA is supposed to allow valid access patterns, so for non-buggy app= s + > > policies, the rename will be fine and does not change the (observed= ) > > permissions. > That still breaks POSIX, right? Hopefully it will not break any apps, > but... No, it does not break POSIX. Unless, of course, there's a bug in the policy or in the program. Bugs are generally not covered by POSIX, for some strange reason. (The argument that POSIX codifies implementation bugs in Unix(tm) implementations of the time non-withstanding.) > > A veto is not a technical argument. All technical arguments (except= for > > "path name is ugly, yuk yuk!") have been addressed, have they not? > There still is "it does not work with long pathnames". >=20 > Plus IIRC we have something like "AA has to allocate path-sized > buffers along every syscall". That is an implementation bug though. I'm sure we have other bugs in th= e kernel too - this isn't a design flaw.=20 (If people are allowed to thinair solutions for implementing AA on top of SELinux, I can thinair that this can be solved by reverse-matching the dentry tree against the policy as the path is traversed and constructed, requiring a constant sized buffer.) Regards, Lars --=20 Teamlead Kernel, SuSE Labs, Research and Development SUSE LINUX Products GmbH, GF: Markus Rex, HRB 16746 (AG N=FCrnberg) "Experience is the name everyone gives to their mistakes." -- Oscar Wil= de - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-securit= y-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html