From: Ingo Molnar Date: Wed, 06 May 2009 21:29:13 +0000 Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86-64: seccomp: fix 32/64 syscall hole Message-Id: <20090506212913.GC4861@elte.hu> List-Id: References: <20090228030226.C0D34FC3DA@magilla.sf.frob.com> <20090228030413.5B915FC3DA@magilla.sf.frob.com> <20090228072554.CFEA6FC3DA@magilla.sf.frob.com> <904b25810905061146ged374f2se0afd24e9e3c1f06@mail.gmail.com> In-Reply-To: <904b25810905061146ged374f2se0afd24e9e3c1f06@mail.gmail.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit To: Markus Gutschke =?utf-8?B?KOmhp+Wtn+WLpCk=?= Cc: Linus Torvalds , Roland McGrath , Andrew Morton , x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@kernel.org, linux-mips@linux-mips.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org * Markus Gutschke (顧孟勤) wrote: > On Sat, Feb 28, 2009 at 10:23, Linus Torvalds > wrote: > > And I guess the seccomp interaction means that this is > > potentially a 2.6.29 thing. Not that I know whether anybody > > actually _uses_ seccomp. It does seem to be enabled in at least > > Fedora kernels, but it might not be used anywhere. > > In the Linux version of Google Chrome, we are currently working on > code that will use seccomp for parts of our sandboxing solution. That's a pretty interesting usage. What would be fallback mode you are using if the kernel doesnt have seccomp built in? Completely non-sandboxed? Or a ptrace/PTRACE_SYSCALL based sandbox? Ingo