Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2009 08:12:46 +0200
From: Luca Berra <bluca@comedia.it>
Message-ID: <20090810061245.GA9508@maude.comedia.it>
References: <20090808132614.GA29656@fancy-poultry.org>
	<4A7D91A8.5080902@gmx.de>
	<20090808153635.GA31434@fancy-poultry.org>
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In-Reply-To: <20090808153635.GA31434@fancy-poultry.org>
Subject: Re: [dm-crypt] LUKS/dm-crypt vulnerable?
To: dm-crypt@saout.de

On Sat, Aug 08, 2009 at 05:36:35PM +0200, Heinz Diehl wrote:
>But what happens when the machine is powered off and stolen?
>The thief wants to have my data. Can he/she use something like "stoned" to
>get into the system and decrypt the harddisk contents?
To achieve this, they will have to hand it back, wait for you to type
your password to boot, then steal it again :P

Stoned is just a trojan that installs into the boot sector,
a very well done trojan, but that is.
The whole argument about stoned and truecrypt is that stoned developer
insisted truecrypt was not secure, because it did not enforce checking
of boot sector integrity.
Truecrypt developers said that was a moot point, because, if someone is
able to replace the boot sector it could well replace the code that
checks its integrity.

add a bit of hype, mix .....

L.

-- 
Luca Berra -- bluca@comedia.it
         Communication Media & Services S.r.l.
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