Return-Path: Received: from tansi.org (ns.km10532-04.keymachine.de [87.118.102.195]) by mail.saout.de (Postfix) with ESMTP for ; Mon, 21 Sep 2009 17:08:12 +0200 (CEST) Received: from gatewagner.dyndns.org (84-74-165-216.dclient.hispeed.ch [84.74.165.216]) by tansi.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7CF284250006 for ; Mon, 21 Sep 2009 17:08:13 +0200 (CEST) Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2009 17:08:09 +0200 From: Arno Wagner Message-ID: <20090921150809.GA25209@tansi.org> References: <2894495.33731253540870681.JavaMail.root@IRL-DUB-P-SRV-02> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Subject: Re: [dm-crypt] Remote authentication? List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: dm-crypt@saout.de On Mon, Sep 21, 2009 at 10:07:45AM -0400, Vladimir Giszpenc wrote: > > > It lists two types of attack to this approach: > > > > (1) ColdBoot Attack by reading the crypto password from the ram blocks > > (not much you can't do against that without special hardware, see > here) > > I am surprised that coreboot has not gotten more press about their > capabilities. > I could swear that they claimed they could load the OS and wipe the > memory on unload as a precaution for the paranoid. I don't have any > details, but it sounded cool. I think I saw it in a Google Tech talk > video. Well, the only option to wipe memory in protection against a ColdBoot attack is if you have batteries in the RAM module and an additional processor there that does the wipe. However inflated claims have a long tradition in the indutrial security field, so it is also possible they just did not tell the truth. Arno -- Arno Wagner, Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform., CISSP -- Email: arno@wagner.name GnuPG: ID: 1E25338F FP: 0C30 5782 9D93 F785 E79C 0296 797F 6B50 1E25 338F ---- Cuddly UI's are the manifestation of wishful thinking. -- Dylan Evans If it's in the news, don't worry about it. The very definition of "news" is "something that hardly ever happens." -- Bruce Schneier