Return-Path: Received: from tansi.org (ns.km10532-04.keymachine.de [87.118.102.195]) by mail.saout.de (Postfix) with ESMTP for ; Mon, 21 Sep 2009 17:20:18 +0200 (CEST) Received: from gatewagner.dyndns.org (84-74-165-216.dclient.hispeed.ch [84.74.165.216]) by tansi.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 529CF4250006 for ; Mon, 21 Sep 2009 17:20:19 +0200 (CEST) Date: Mon, 21 Sep 2009 17:20:17 +0200 From: Arno Wagner Message-ID: <20090921152016.GB25209@tansi.org> References: <20090917215809.GC23460@resivo.wgnet.de> <2894495.33731253540870681.JavaMail.root@IRL-DUB-P-SRV-02> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <2894495.33731253540870681.JavaMail.root@IRL-DUB-P-SRV-02> Subject: Re: [dm-crypt] Remote authentication? List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: dm-crypt@saout.de On Mon, Sep 21, 2009 at 02:47:50PM +0100, Niall Murphy wrote: > ----- Jonas Meurer wrote: [...] > That sounds ideal. However, i came across this so have some reservations. > http://www.howtoforge.com/unlock-a-luks-encrypted-root-partition-via-ssh-on-ubuntu > > It lists two types of attack to this approach: > > (1) ColdBoot Attack by reading the crypto password from the ram blocks > (not much you can't do against that without special hardware, see here) If you are worried abouy ColdBoot attacks, you need to increase physical server security. A ColdBoot attacks are not possible without access to the hardware and are generally not a concern except in special situations. They also need advanced skills. They are not expensive though if the hardware access is there. > (2) The created initrd can be manipulated so that it logs the crypto > password somewhere. As /boot is not encrypted an attacker may gain this > way the password for the LUKS-devices. You could, to prevent that, make a > bootable cd with the according kernels and initrds and implement some kind > of hash check... maybe there are other methods... feedback is welcomed > here. If an attacker gets this level of control, other things are possible. The CD is not really a solution, since the attacker could change the boot order and boot a changed version of the CD from HDD (for example). Basically the CD for a clean system is only reliable if no other writable storage media are accessible at boot time and a cold boot is ensured. Otherwise an attacker could also boot the CD into a virtual machine, with the obvious consequences. There are possibilities to fight this, e.g. a hard power-cycle every few hours and hardware that makes the HDDs unavailable until the CD has successfully booted. But I doubt that is an adequate solution here and it has drastic negative impact on reliability. Better just do a careful restrictive firewall configuration, and make sure your system is patched. Arno -- Arno Wagner, Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform., CISSP -- Email: arno@wagner.name GnuPG: ID: 1E25338F FP: 0C30 5782 9D93 F785 E79C 0296 797F 6B50 1E25 338F ---- Cuddly UI's are the manifestation of wishful thinking. -- Dylan Evans If it's in the news, don't worry about it. The very definition of "news" is "something that hardly ever happens." -- Bruce Schneier