Return-Path: Received: from mx1.suse.de (cantor.suse.de [195.135.220.2]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.saout.de (Postfix) with ESMTPS for ; Mon, 12 Oct 2009 11:12:33 +0200 (CEST) Received: from relay1.suse.de (mail2.suse.de [195.135.221.8]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.suse.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id C93226CB00 for ; Mon, 12 Oct 2009 11:12:32 +0200 (CEST) Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2009 11:12:29 +0200 From: Ludwig Nussel Message-ID: <20091012111229.64a374ac@tanana.suse.de> In-Reply-To: References: <1253821495.4683.25.camel@P7230> <20090929134450.76dab774@tanana.suse.de> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Subject: Re: [dm-crypt] Shared library for cryptsetup List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: dm-crypt@saout.de J=C3=BCrgen Pabel wrote: > > Interesting idea. I wonder whether those separate key files per user > > are worth the effort though. LUKS has eight key slots so when > > reserving one for the admin you still have seven left for users. > > Have you considered simply storing a mapping of user names to key > > slots? >=20 > Well, one of the major reasons was that it eliminates this limit > (although I agree that it's usually not really limit with practical > implications). >=20 > Another reason is that tokentube allows for different deployment options:= it's > possible to configure the system in such a way that the user's auth files= (key > files) are in fact owned by the user. That's not a common scenario but I'= ve > seen environments which required such setups. Wouldn't that expose the master key to the users? > > Also, as long as you're using local authentication you don't need to > > store the password for pam authentication. Should be sufficient to > > just reconfigure the displaymanager to auto login the user that > > unlocked the root device. >=20 > True, but that requires "raw" device access (instead of "working" at the > filesystem layer) - which most often requires root (or at least appropria= te > group) privileges for accessing the "raw" device during execution (like v= ia > setuid'ing the binary).=20 The password is changed via pam module which typically runs as root anyways (/usr/bin/passwd is usually setuid root). Also I expect e.g. DeviceKit to add a luks key change method sooner or later which wouldn't require direct device access by the user either. > All in all, I think it's a "clean" solution for the stated problem. Well, if the slot limit is no problem the tokentube way looks rather complex to me :-) cu Ludwig --=20 (o_ Ludwig Nussel //\ =20 V_/_ http://www.suse.de/ SUSE LINUX Products GmbH, GF: Markus Rex, HRB 16746 (AG Nuernberg)