Received: from goalie.tycho.ncsc.mil (goalie [144.51.3.250]) by tarius.tycho.ncsc.mil (8.13.1/8.13.1) with ESMTP id nBIIULIR023110 for ; Fri, 18 Dec 2009 13:30:21 -0500 Received: from g4t0017.houston.hp.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by msux-gh1-uea01.nsa.gov (8.12.10/8.12.10) with ESMTP id nBIIT8ab003222 for ; Fri, 18 Dec 2009 18:29:08 GMT Subject: [RFC PATCH v3] selinux: Fix security_compute_av() to not return unknown class errors when in permissive mode To: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov From: Paul Moore Cc: russell@coker.com.au, amworsley@gmail.com Date: Fri, 18 Dec 2009 13:30:16 -0500 Message-ID: <20091218183016.9365.621.stgit@flek.lan> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Sender: owner-selinux@tycho.nsa.gov List-Id: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov It is possible security_compute_av() to return -EINVAL, even when in permissive mode, due to unknown object classes and SIDs. This patch fixes this by doing away with the return value for security_compute_av() and treating unknown classes and SIDs as permission denials. NOTE: This patch has only been compile tested, and is only intended for review. However, if someone wants to give it a try I would appreciate it as my time is somewhat limited since I'm technically on "vacation" as of a few hours ago :) Reported-by: Andrew Worsley Signed-off-by: Paul Moore --- security/selinux/avc.c | 14 ++-- security/selinux/include/security.h | 8 +- security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 4 + security/selinux/ss/services.c | 113 +++++++++++++---------------------- 4 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 85 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c index f2dde26..7471a0a 100644 --- a/security/selinux/avc.c +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c @@ -731,7 +731,6 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, struct avc_node *node; struct av_decision avd_entry, *avd; int rc = 0; - u32 denied; BUG_ON(!requested); @@ -746,9 +745,7 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, else avd = &avd_entry; - rc = security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, avd); - if (rc) - goto out; + security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd); rcu_read_lock(); node = avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd); } else { @@ -757,12 +754,11 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, avd = &node->ae.avd; } - denied = requested & ~(avd->allowed); - - if (denied) { + if (requested & ~(avd->allowed)) { if (flags & AVC_STRICT) rc = -EACCES; - else if (!selinux_enforcing || (avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE)) + else if (!selinux_enforcing || + (avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE)) avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd->seqno); else @@ -770,7 +766,7 @@ int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, } rcu_read_unlock(); -out: + return rc; } diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index 2553266..609334d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -96,12 +96,10 @@ struct av_decision { /* definitions of av_decision.flags */ #define AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE 0x0001 -int security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 requested, - struct av_decision *avd); +void security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, + struct av_decision *avd); -int security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, - u16 tclass, u32 requested, +int security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd); int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index fab36fd..a45ac7c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -511,6 +511,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) if (!tcon) goto out; + /* note: we don't currently use "req" anymore but we'll leave it here + * just to preserve/enforce the existing userspace API */ length = -EINVAL; if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu %x", scon, tcon, &tclass, &req) != 4) goto out2; @@ -522,7 +524,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) if (length < 0) goto out2; - length = security_compute_av_user(ssid, tsid, tclass, req, &avd); + length = security_compute_av_user(ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd); if (length < 0) goto out2; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index b3efae2..e789b34 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -90,7 +90,6 @@ static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext, struct context *tcontext, u16 tclass, - u32 requested, struct av_decision *avd); struct selinux_mapping { @@ -196,23 +195,6 @@ static u16 unmap_class(u16 tclass) return tclass; } -static u32 unmap_perm(u16 tclass, u32 tperm) -{ - if (tclass < current_mapping_size) { - unsigned i; - u32 kperm = 0; - - for (i = 0; i < current_mapping[tclass].num_perms; i++) - if (tperm & (1<allowed) == avd->allowed) return; /* no masked permission */ @@ -569,7 +549,6 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext, context_struct_compute_av(scontext, &lo_tcontext, tclass, - requested, &lo_avd); if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed) return; /* no masked permission */ @@ -586,7 +565,6 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext, context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext, &lo_tcontext, tclass, - requested, &lo_avd); if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed) return; /* no masked permission */ @@ -610,7 +588,6 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext, static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext, struct context *tcontext, u16 tclass, - u32 requested, struct av_decision *avd) { struct constraint_node *constraint; @@ -622,20 +599,8 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext, struct ebitmap_node *snode, *tnode; unsigned int i, j; - /* - * Initialize the access vectors to the default values. - */ - avd->allowed = 0; - avd->auditallow = 0; - avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff; - avd->seqno = latest_granting; - avd->flags = 0; - - if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) { - if (printk_ratelimit()) - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass); + if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) return -EINVAL; - } tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1]; @@ -704,8 +669,7 @@ static int context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext, * constraint, lazy checks have to mask any violated * permission and notice it to userspace via audit. */ - type_attribute_bounds_av(scontext, tcontext, - tclass, requested, avd); + type_attribute_bounds_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd); return 0; } @@ -890,11 +854,11 @@ out: static int security_compute_av_core(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, - u32 requested, + int allow_unknown, struct av_decision *avd) { struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL; - int rc = 0; + int rc; scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid); if (!scontext) { @@ -909,8 +873,9 @@ static int security_compute_av_core(u32 ssid, return -EINVAL; } - rc = context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, - requested, avd); + rc = context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd); + if (rc == -EINVAL && !allow_unknown && printk_ratelimit()) + printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Invalid class %hu\n", tclass); /* permissive domain? */ if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type)) @@ -924,70 +889,78 @@ static int security_compute_av_core(u32 ssid, * @ssid: source security identifier * @tsid: target security identifier * @tclass: target security class - * @requested: requested permissions * @avd: access vector decisions * * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass. - * Return -%EINVAL if any of the parameters are invalid or %0 - * if the access vector decisions were computed successfully. */ -int security_compute_av(u32 ssid, - u32 tsid, - u16 orig_tclass, - u32 orig_requested, - struct av_decision *avd) +void security_compute_av(u32 ssid, + u32 tsid, + u16 orig_tclass, + struct av_decision *avd) { u16 tclass; - u32 requested; int rc; read_lock(&policy_rwlock); + /* Initialize the access vectors to the default values. */ + avd->allowed = 0; + avd->auditallow = 0; + avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff; + avd->seqno = latest_granting; + avd->flags = 0; + if (!ss_initialized) goto allow; - requested = unmap_perm(orig_tclass, orig_requested); tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass); - if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) { - if (policydb.allow_unknown) - goto allow; - rc = -EINVAL; - goto out; - } - rc = security_compute_av_core(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, avd); + if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) + goto error; + rc = security_compute_av_core(ssid, tsid, tclass, + policydb.allow_unknown, avd); + if (unlikely(rc != 0)) + goto error; map_decision(orig_tclass, avd, policydb.allow_unknown); out: read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); - return rc; + return; allow: avd->allowed = 0xffffffff; + goto out; +error: + if (policydb.allow_unknown) + goto allow; + avd->allowed = 0; avd->auditallow = 0; avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff; - avd->seqno = latest_granting; - avd->flags = 0; - rc = 0; goto out; } int security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, - u32 requested, struct av_decision *avd) { int rc; + read_lock(&policy_rwlock); + + /* Initialize the access vectors to the default values. */ + avd->allowed = 0; + avd->auditallow = 0; + avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff; + avd->seqno = latest_granting; + avd->flags = 0; + if (!ss_initialized) { avd->allowed = 0xffffffff; - avd->auditallow = 0; - avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff; - avd->seqno = latest_granting; - return 0; + rc = 0; + goto out; } - read_lock(&policy_rwlock); - rc = security_compute_av_core(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, avd); + rc = security_compute_av_core(ssid, tsid, tclass, 0, avd); +out: read_unlock(&policy_rwlock); return rc; } -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. 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