From: Simon Horman Subject: [PATCH] ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments Date: Tue, 29 Dec 2009 12:58:22 +1100 Message-ID: <20091229015822.GF10172@verge.net.au> Mime-Version: 1.0 Return-path: Content-Disposition: inline Sender: lvs-devel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: netdev@vger.kernel.org, lvs-devel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Arjan van de Ven , Wensong Zhang , Julian Anastasov , David Miller , Patrick McHardy From: Arjan van de Ven ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd to find the right length. Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the range that the array provides, allowing for an index outside of the array, which then gives a "garbage" result into the length, which then gets used for copying into a stack buffer. Fix this by adding sanity checks on these as well as the copy size. [ horms@verge.net.au: adjusted limit to IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX ] Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven Acked-by: Julian Anastasov Signed-off-by: Simon Horman --- net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c | 14 +++++++++++++- 1 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) Hi Arjen, this is the 4th response to your patch. I am guessing the previous ones didn't reach you for some reason. And I guess this one wont for the same reason. I agree with Julian's assessment that your patch shouldn't be necessary, but on the other hand I think that the checks are reasonable. Your original patch made checks of the form of "cmd > IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX + 1". I have updated this to "cmd > IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX", as suggested by Julian, as the optmax elements of struct nf_sockopt_ops set a non-inclusive range. http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/0910.0/00852.html Index: net-next-2.6/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c =================================================================== --- net-next-2.6.orig/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c 2009-12-29 12:39:40.000000000 +1100 +++ net-next-2.6/net/netfilter/ipvs/ip_vs_ctl.c 2009-12-29 12:46:47.000000000 +1100 @@ -2077,6 +2077,10 @@ do_ip_vs_set_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cm if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; + if (cmd < IP_VS_BASE_CTL || cmd > IP_VS_SO_SET_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + if (len < 0 || len > MAX_ARG_LEN) + return -EINVAL; if (len != set_arglen[SET_CMDID(cmd)]) { pr_err("set_ctl: len %u != %u\n", len, set_arglen[SET_CMDID(cmd)]); @@ -2352,17 +2356,25 @@ do_ip_vs_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cm { unsigned char arg[128]; int ret = 0; + unsigned int copylen; if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; + if (cmd < IP_VS_BASE_CTL || cmd > IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX) + return -EINVAL; + if (*len < get_arglen[GET_CMDID(cmd)]) { pr_err("get_ctl: len %u < %u\n", *len, get_arglen[GET_CMDID(cmd)]); return -EINVAL; } - if (copy_from_user(arg, user, get_arglen[GET_CMDID(cmd)]) != 0) + copylen = get_arglen[GET_CMDID(cmd)]; + if (copylen > 128) + return -EINVAL; + + if (copy_from_user(arg, user, copylen) != 0) return -EFAULT; if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&__ip_vs_mutex))