Return-Path: Received: from tansi.org (ns.km10532-04.keymachine.de [87.118.102.195]) by mail.saout.de (Postfix) with ESMTP for ; Wed, 30 Dec 2009 03:52:24 +0100 (CET) Received: from gatewagner.dyndns.org (84-74-164-239.dclient.hispeed.ch [84.74.164.239]) by tansi.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1EA694250002 for ; Wed, 30 Dec 2009 03:52:24 +0100 (CET) Date: Wed, 30 Dec 2009 03:52:23 +0100 From: Arno Wagner Message-ID: <20091230025223.GA20576@tansi.org> References: <4B3914FB.7060008@gmail.com> <20091228212038.GB2224@maude.comedia.it> <4B3925F0.4050409@gmail.com> <20091228231158.GB16466@fancy-poultry.org> <20091229202429.GB17029@tansi.org> <20091229211536.GA31271@fancy-poultry.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20091229211536.GA31271@fancy-poultry.org> Subject: Re: [dm-crypt] encrypted root: prevent / detect tampering with kernel / initrd List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: dm-crypt@saout.de On Tue, Dec 29, 2009 at 10:15:36PM +0100, Heinz Diehl wrote: > On 29.12.2009, Arno Wagner wrote: > > > I don't agree. But you have to think outside of the box and use a > > separate, uncompromised boot medium that the attacker did not have > > access to. > > Sorry, but I can't see how this would help. The attacker installs a > hardware keylogger and just doesn't care. That will require a second access to the hardware. And it is a whole order of magnitude (at least) more difficult and expensive that the software attack. > It's a matter of concept: before a security solution is implemented, a > risk analysis has to be done. To have /boot on an external medium or to > store checksums of the unencrypted files on a CD/DVD/stick is fine, as > long as the risk it carries is accepted, along with the worst case scenario > under given circumstances. It's up to the operator. > > For total security, the machine is regarded compromised if access to it ever > has been granted. As a last consequence, it's impossible to detect if the > machine has been tampered with. "total security" is a meaningless concept, unless you design and manufacture all hardware components yourself, which in practce means it is a meaningless concept. Arno -- Arno Wagner, Dr. sc. techn., Dipl. Inform., CISSP -- Email: arno@wagner.name GnuPG: ID: 1E25338F FP: 0C30 5782 9D93 F785 E79C 0296 797F 6B50 1E25 338F ---- Cuddly UI's are the manifestation of wishful thinking. -- Dylan Evans If it's in the news, don't worry about it. The very definition of "news" is "something that hardly ever happens." -- Bruce Schneier