Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.8 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 443CDC433E1 for ; Wed, 20 May 2020 07:01:12 +0000 (UTC) Received: from bombadil.infradead.org (bombadil.infradead.org [198.137.202.133]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7CE4820756 for ; Wed, 20 May 2020 07:01:11 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=lists.infradead.org header.i=@lists.infradead.org header.b="u0VLiILh"; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (2048-bit key) header.d=chronox.de header.i=@chronox.de header.b="kSiQO8lc" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 7CE4820756 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=chronox.de Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-arm-kernel-bounces+infradead-linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=bombadil.20170209; h=Sender: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-Type:Cc:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post: List-Archive:List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:MIME-Version:References:In-Reply-To: Message-ID:Date:Subject:To:From:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description: Resent-Date:Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID: List-Owner; bh=0couDBYkZOovPkpRE8qXqFmfkPJCLXkdGIHIxNMWWhE=; b=u0VLiILhzsFmR2 uqy5RMXNxk9J8aFeChxUsBISEWq+ySxq1reLX9ixmmE2iqYjGgRncyccCbcc/dnlKO7OU+5Vz6bdG R2HyFbz/2U6rj2NRVwpXURhYohUTMyvMv4401zOkXtj3M/HikhiJop8MOwaCxR3bFW3cYF2Nbjkvb zccJCFgpCzlMG/05bfdDoiEcn+Au7dlYk5Bu1Gcqd9kF+K0VIxKcBCQPn0TQbI9zJjY29sBRmfH4j MRblxNbFF9mghA8YasWjRwkpycpN3vYOsU2smTScQn8tEh8SQMZ4+2t0WhaQkbeTlbolarw1m9Dn2 GdUryfQ2z70vKCWEUCdg==; Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=bombadil.infradead.org) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1jbIj1-0006TW-0v; Wed, 20 May 2020 07:01:11 +0000 Received: from mo6-p02-ob.smtp.rzone.de ([2a01:238:20a:202:5302::9]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1jbIiw-0006Sf-3q for linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org; Wed, 20 May 2020 07:01:08 +0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1589958064; s=strato-dkim-0002; d=chronox.de; h=References:In-Reply-To:Message-ID:Date:Subject:Cc:To:From: X-RZG-CLASS-ID:X-RZG-AUTH:From:Subject:Sender; bh=ZXbdSR51vsexYPQyO6+XHaWV+/YRvrsTI2dhYbAFkWE=; b=kSiQO8lco+6O8JInmIR1847diWn3w8daT+EijRodtmDgkYlPfDJfj2RiZ/gaY5LBHc gl17jXe1ojHO0nbwgh5FccxYqFx5GAd4D9VNnAKiLzBnXeNkDeEdixsB2AiUyvoDZJ2/ vPdoyXNNWewZd153Kp01rq1qcoD3O36kQBsSgYOI0lgj+P7gbN+bQJhTjic7Z7jQ3lTS rlmjqCB2ZfjOqutiSGNwK+c5qr8lG6tx3IVmoDngFJXGMtQ8Z+Ne3J38tRTSdsUeIi8z hYw7fgSlqqF7MxOfA0vMHJ9JYvVkDPc6YqV5etzMgv7gygTAi8EH11lAwyop3VOJ7UIs ZfiA== X-RZG-AUTH: ":P2ERcEykfu11Y98lp/T7+hdri+uKZK8TKWEqNyiHySGSa9k9xmwdNnzGHXPbI/Sc5g==" X-RZG-CLASS-ID: mo00 Received: from tauon.chronox.de by smtp.strato.de (RZmta 46.7.0 DYNA|AUTH) with ESMTPSA id k09005w4K7143HY (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256 bits)) (Client did not present a certificate); Wed, 20 May 2020 09:01:04 +0200 (CEST) From: Stephan Mueller To: Ard Biesheuvel Subject: Re: [RFC/RFT PATCH 0/2] crypto: add CTS output IVs for arm64 and testmgr Date: Wed, 20 May 2020 09:01:03 +0200 Message-ID: <2010567.jSmZeKYv2B@tauon.chronox.de> In-Reply-To: References: <20200519190211.76855-1-ardb@kernel.org> <16394356.0UTfFWEGjO@tauon.chronox.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20200520_000106_748556_4333F719 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 32.98 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Eric Biggers , Linux Crypto Mailing List , Linux ARM Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+infradead-linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org Am Mittwoch, 20. Mai 2020, 08:54:10 CEST schrieb Ard Biesheuvel: Hi Ard, > On Wed, 20 May 2020 at 08:47, Stephan Mueller wrote: > > Am Mittwoch, 20. Mai 2020, 08:40:57 CEST schrieb Ard Biesheuvel: > > > > Hi Ard, > > > > > On Wed, 20 May 2020 at 08:03, Stephan Mueller wrote: > > > > Am Dienstag, 19. Mai 2020, 21:02:09 CEST schrieb Ard Biesheuvel: > > > > > > > > Hi Ard, > > > > > > > > > Stephan reports that the arm64 implementation of cts(cbc(aes)) > > > > > deviates > > > > > from the generic implementation in what it returns as the output IV. > > > > > So > > > > > fix this, and add some test vectors to catch other non-compliant > > > > > implementations. > > > > > > > > > > Stephan, could you provide a reference for the NIST validation tool > > > > > and > > > > > how it flags this behaviour as non-compliant? Thanks. > > > > > > > > The test definition that identified the inconsistent behavior is > > > > specified > > > > with [1]. Note, this testing is intended to become an RFC standard. > > > > > > Are you referring to the line > > > > > > CT[j] = AES_CBC_CS_ENCRYPT(Key[i], PT[j]) > > > > > > where the CTS transform is invoked without an IV altogether? > > > > Precisely. > > > > > That > > > simply seems like a bug to me. In an abstract specification like this, > > > it would be insane for pseudocode functions to be stateful objects, > > > and there is nothing in the pseudocode that explicitly captures the > > > 'output IV' of that function call. > > > > I think the description may be updated by simply refer to IV[j-1]. Then > > you > > would not have a stateful operation, but you rest on the IV of the > > previous > > operation. > > But that value is not the value you are using now, right? I suspect > that the line > > IV[i+1] = MSB(CT[j], IV.length) Yes, such a line would be needed. > > needs to be duplicated in the inner loop for j, although that would > require different versions for CS1/2/3 Correct in the sense to specify exactly what the IV after a cipher operation actually is. > > > The state of all block chaining modes we currently have is defined with > > the > > IV. That is the reason why I mentioned it can be implemented stateless > > when I am able to get the IV output from the previous operation. > > But it is simply the same as the penultimate block of ciphertext. So > you can simply capture it after encrypt, or before decrypt. There is > really no need to rely on the CTS transformation to pass it back to > you via the buffer that is only specified to provide an input to the > CTS transform. Let me recheck that as I am not fully sure on that one. But if it can be handled that way, it would make life easier. > > > > > To facilitate that testing, NIST offers an internet service, the ACVP > > > > server, that allows obtaining test vectors and uploading responses. > > > > You > > > > see the large number of concluded testing with [2]. A particular > > > > completion of the CTS testing I finished yesterday is given in [3]. > > > > That > > > > particular testing was also performed on an ARM system with CE where > > > > the > > > > issue was detected. > > > > > > > > I am performing the testing with [4] that has an extension to test the > > > > kernel crypto API. > > > > > > OK. So given that that neither the CTS spec nor this document makes > > > any mention of an output IV or what its value should be, my suggestion > > > would be to capture the IV directly from the ciphertext, rather than > > > relying on some unspecified behavior to give you the right data. Note > > > that we have other implementations of cts(cbc(aes)) in the kernel as > > > well (h/w accelerated ones) and if there is no specification that > > > defines this behavior, you really shouldn't be relying on it. > > > > Agreed, but all I need is the IV from the previous round without relying > > on > > any state. > > So just grab it from the ciphertext of the previous round. > > > > That 'specification' invokes AES_CBC_CS_ENCRYPT() twice using a > > > different prototype, without any mention whatsoever what the implied > > > value of IV[] is if it is missing. This is especially problematic > > > given that it seems to cover all of CS1/2/3, and the relation between > > > next IV and ciphertext is not even the same between those for inputs > > > that are a multiple of the blocksize. > > > > I will relay that comment back to the authors for update. > > Thanks. Thank you for your ideas! > > > > > [1] > > > > https://github.com/usnistgov/ACVP/blob/master/artifacts/draft-celi-acv > > > > p-b > > > > lock-ciph-00.txt#L366 > > > > > > > > [2] > > > > https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-algorithm-validation-prog > > > > ram > > > > / > > > > validation-search?searchMode=validation&family=1&productType=-1&ipp=2 > > > > 5 > > > > > > > > [3] > > > > https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/cryptographic-algorithm-validation-prog > > > > ram > > > > / details?validation=32608 > > > > > > > > [4] https://github.com/smuellerDD/acvpparser > > > > > > > > > Cc: Stephan Mueller > > > > > > > > > > Ard Biesheuvel (2): > > > > > crypto: arm64/aes - align output IV with generic CBC-CTS driver > > > > > crypto: testmgr - add output IVs for AES-CBC with ciphertext > > > > > stealing > > > > > > > > > > arch/arm64/crypto/aes-modes.S | 2 ++ > > > > > crypto/testmgr.h | 12 ++++++++++++ > > > > > 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+) > > > > > > > > Ciao > > > > Stephan > > > > Ciao > > Stephan Ciao Stephan _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel