Return-Path: From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Tomas Hozza , "K. Y. Srinivasan" , Ben Hutchings Subject: [ 68/72] tools: hv: Netlink source address validation allows DoS Date: Tue, 26 Mar 2013 15:51:51 -0700 Message-Id: <20130326224926.664561468@linuxfoundation.org> In-Reply-To: <20130326224919.675227837@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20130326224919.675227837@linuxfoundation.org> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: 3.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Tomas Hozza commit 95a69adab9acfc3981c504737a2b6578e4d846ef upstream. The source code without this patch caused hypervkvpd to exit when it processed a spoofed Netlink packet which has been sent from an untrusted local user. Now Netlink messages with a non-zero nl_pid source address are ignored and a warning is printed into the syslog. Signed-off-by: Tomas Hozza Acked-by: K. Y. Srinivasan Cc: Ben Hutchings Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- tools/hv/hv_kvp_daemon.c | 8 +++++++- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/tools/hv/hv_kvp_daemon.c +++ b/tools/hv/hv_kvp_daemon.c @@ -727,13 +727,19 @@ int main(void) len = recvfrom(fd, kvp_recv_buffer, sizeof(kvp_recv_buffer), 0, addr_p, &addr_l); - if (len < 0 || addr.nl_pid) { + if (len < 0) { syslog(LOG_ERR, "recvfrom failed; pid:%u error:%d %s", addr.nl_pid, errno, strerror(errno)); close(fd); return -1; } + if (addr.nl_pid) { + syslog(LOG_WARNING, "Received packet from untrusted pid:%u", + addr.nl_pid); + continue; + } + incoming_msg = (struct nlmsghdr *)kvp_recv_buffer; incoming_cn_msg = (struct cn_msg *)NLMSG_DATA(incoming_msg); hv_msg = (struct hv_kvp_msg *)incoming_cn_msg->data;