From: Hannes Frederic Sowa Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next 1/2] ipv4: add forwarding_uses_pmtu knob to protect forward path to use pmtu info Date: Tue, 31 Dec 2013 04:52:47 +0100 Message-ID: <20131231035247.GA27636@order.stressinduktion.org> References: <20131220130822.GD32129@order.stressinduktion.org> <20131230.222044.884570280065942449.davem@davemloft.net> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, eric.dumazet@gmail.com To: David Miller Return-path: Received: from order.stressinduktion.org ([87.106.68.36]:59832 "EHLO order.stressinduktion.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751331Ab3LaDwt (ORCPT ); Mon, 30 Dec 2013 22:52:49 -0500 Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20131230.222044.884570280065942449.davem@davemloft.net> Sender: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On Mon, Dec 30, 2013 at 10:20:44PM -0500, David Miller wrote: > Sorry Hannes, I'm still not happy with this change at all. > > First of all, you misunderstood what I said last time around. > I basically was trying to say that if you make this facility > available at all, distributions are going to turn it on by > default even if you make the kernel default to off. Yes, I am sorry for that. > That drives me nuts, and I don't want to give people this > opportunity to screw things up again just like they did > for rp_filter, which also defaults to off. > > Secondly, I don't see how this is as big of an issue as you > present it to be. At best, the language is way too strong. > > How can PMTU information be injected into the kernel? I used icmp_err handler with type == ICMP_ECHOREPLY. It is pretty open as it does not validate (and cannot) validate local socket state. This also applies to ipv6 and raw handler could also be a problem. > Local connections, well we want that and it's good. And for TCP you > have to be able to inject a valid TCP packet that can be validated by > the stack for the PMTU information to stick. > > Tunnels, well you said that tunnels don't apply to this change. > > The only thing left are things like AH and ESP, which also perform > some level of validation making sure that some state exists. And > frankly for non-tunneled IPSEC this PMTU information is absolutely > essential. > > I really don't want to apply these changes, sorry. I can understand. I'll do more research on this and try to present more convincing reasons why this could be a problem and explain and check more carefully how this interacts with the xfrm subsystem. I am still convinced we should suppress path mtu information in forwarding path. I'll review the language of this change, too. ;) Thank you for the review and a happy new year!