From: Tejun Heo Subject: Re: [RFC v2 09/10] landlock: Handle cgroups Date: Fri, 26 Aug 2016 11:50:26 -0400 Message-ID: <20160826155026.GD16906@mtj.duckdns.org> References: <1472121165-29071-1-git-send-email-mic@digikod.net> <1472121165-29071-10-git-send-email-mic@digikod.net> <57BF043D.4000300@digikod.net> Reply-To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Mime-Version: 1.0 Return-path: List-Post: List-Help: List-Unsubscribe: List-Subscribe: List-ID: DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=sender:date:from:to:cc:subject:message-id:references:mime-version :content-disposition:in-reply-to:user-agent; bh=xvYoF0WTOGV8gZ4IAT5f5OLJOBQldCuuoPlYA3NFvEA=; b=GPrbUBhUPWWlRZnD6hf2aETldE6ZXdaBpK/8ggrMTdDd6mj+6OfVbqW3YnVSAnzmHj 6GQcW3mUKpsHJ52xBcRxoExqKlL3J1rVItFLwPiM1RZXHJ5wA0IDmbMzFwntopnXuhB7 zxmxox0u9UE222oIEEwqnuXohfwIxmOaLtewvSrBFao8WbUwDsB8Uid7MOsFz6SKynY1 6+5V564mAxCON77eCRVJlHg/POeJkdKIGwDQs4Zogd8fl/lD/sCBo9mf4FK6s2r7wXIH iJcumOniAk7qbluGd2fag99TLVJ5Jt7cyAx9WmMtZri7BfKb5CD36HwiwxwuKFIhRmbS WNqg== Sender: Tejun Heo Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: Andy Lutomirski Cc: =?iso-8859-1?Q?Micka=EBl_Sala=FCn?= , LKML , Alexei Starovoitov , Arnd Bergmann , Casey Schaufler , Daniel Borkmann , Daniel Mack , David Drysdale , "David S . Miller" , Elena Reshetova , James Morris , Kees Cook , Paul Moore , Sargun Dhillon , "Serge E . Hallyn" , Will Drewry , Kernel Hardening , Linux API , LSM List , Network Development , "open list:CONTROL GROUP (CGROUP)" Hello, On Fri, Aug 26, 2016 at 07:20:35AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > > This is simply the action of changing the owner of cgroup sysfs files to > > allow an unprivileged user to handle them (cf. Documentation/cgroup-v2.txt) > > As far as I can tell, Tejun and systemd both actively discourage doing > this. Maybe I misunderstand. But in any event, the admin giving you Please refer to "2-5. Delegation" of Documentation/cgroup-v2.txt. Delegation on v1 is broken on both core and specific controller behaviors and thus discouraged. On v2, delegation should work just fine. I haven't looked in detail but in general I'm not too excited about layering security mechanism on top of cgroup. Maybe it makes some sense when security domain coincides with resource domains but at any rate please keep me in the loop. Thanks. -- tejun