Reply-To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Date: Fri, 7 Oct 2016 16:29:55 +0200 From: Jann Horn Message-ID: <20161007142955.GB14666@pc.thejh.net> References: <1475690686-16138-1-git-send-email-william.c.roberts@intel.com> <476DC76E7D1DF2438D32BFADF679FC561CD14829@ORSMSX103.amr.corp.intel.com> <476DC76E7D1DF2438D32BFADF679FC561CD14B1C@ORSMSX103.amr.corp.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha1; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="j+D14l8Ki1YJdzYp" Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <476DC76E7D1DF2438D32BFADF679FC561CD14B1C@ORSMSX103.amr.corp.intel.com> Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] RE: [PATCH] printk: introduce kptr_restrict level 3 To: "Roberts, William C" Cc: Kees Cook , "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" List-ID: --j+D14l8Ki1YJdzYp Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable On Fri, Oct 07, 2016 at 02:19:43PM +0000, Roberts, William C wrote: >=20 >=20 > > -----Original Message----- > > From: keescook@google.com [mailto:keescook@google.com] On Behalf Of Kees > > Cook > > Sent: Thursday, October 6, 2016 5:05 PM > > To: Roberts, William C > > Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com > > Subject: Re: [PATCH] printk: introduce kptr_restrict level 3 > >=20 > > On Thu, Oct 6, 2016 at 8:18 AM, Roberts, William C > > wrote: > > > > > > > > >> -----Original Message----- > > >> From: keescook@google.com [mailto:keescook@google.com] On Behalf Of > > >> Kees Cook > > >> Sent: Wednesday, October 5, 2016 3:34 PM > > >> To: Roberts, William C > > >> Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com; Jonathan Corbet > > >> ; linux-doc@vger.kernel.org; LKML > > >> ; Nick Desaulniers > > >> ; Dave Weinstein > > >> Subject: Re: [PATCH] printk: introduce kptr_restrict level 3 > > >> > > >> On Wed, Oct 5, 2016 at 11:04 AM, wrot= e: > > >> > From: William Roberts > > >> > > > >> > Some out-of-tree modules do not use %pK and just use %p, as it's > > >> > the common C paradigm for printing pointers. Because of this, > > >> > kptr_restrict has no affect on the output and thus, no way to > > >> > contain the kernel address leak. > > >> > > >> Solving this is certainly a good idea -- I'm all for finding a solid= solution. > > >> > > >> > Introduce kptr_restrict level 3 that causes the kernel to treat %p > > >> > as if it was %pK and thus always prints zeros. > > >> > > >> I'm worried that this could break kernel internals where %p is being > > >> used and not exposed to userspace. Maybe those situations don't exis= t... > > >> > > >> Regardless, I would rather do what Grsecurity has done in this area, > > >> and whitelist known-safe values instead. For example, they have %pP > > >> for approved pointers, and %pX for approved > > >> dereference_function_descriptor() output. Everything else is censored > > >> if it is a value in kernel memory and destined for a user-space > > >> memory > > >> buffer: > > >> > > >> if ((unsigned long)ptr > TASK_SIZE && *fmt !=3D 'P' && *fmt = !=3D > > >> 'X' && *fmt !=3D 'K' && is_usercopy_object(buf)) { > > >> printk(KERN_ALERT "grsec: kernel infoleak detected! > > >> Please report this log to spender@grsecurity.net.\n"); > > >> dump_stack(); > > >> ptr =3D NULL; > > >> } > > >> > > >> The "is_usercopy_object()" test is something we can add, which is > > >> testing for a new SLAB flag that is used to mark slab caches as > > >> either used by user-space or not, which is done also through whiteli= sting. > > >> (For more details on this, see: > > >> http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/06/08/10) > > >> > > >> Would you have time/interest to add the slab flags and is_usercopy_o= bject()? > > >> The hardened usercopy part of the slab whitelisting can be separate, > > >> since it likely needs a different usercopy interface to sanely integ= rate with > > upstream. > > > > > > A couple of questions off hand: > > > 1. What about bss statics? I am assuming that when the loader loads u= p a > > module > > > That it's dynamically allocating the .bss section or some equiva= lent. I would > > > Also assume the method you describe would catch that, is that co= rrect? > > > > > > 2. What about stack variables? > >=20 > > It looks like what Grsecurity is doing is saying "if the address is out= side of user- > > space" (" > TASK_SIZE") and it's not whitelisted ('P', > > 'X') and it's going to land in a user-space buffer ("is_usercopy_object= ()", censor it. > > ("K" is already censored -- they're just optimizing to avoid re-checkin= g it > > needlessly.) > >=20 > > So, in this case, all kernel memory, bss and stack included, would be o= utside the > > user-space address range. (I am curious, however, how to apply this to = an > > architecture like s390 which has overlapping address ranges... probably= the > > TASK_SIZE test needs to use some other "is in kernel memory" check that > > compiles down to TASK_SIZE on non-s390, and DTRT on s390, etc.) > >=20 >=20 > Before I go off and attempt this, I just have another dumb question to as= k: >=20 > If the printk copies it into the kernel ring buffer, at some point, someo= ne comes > And asks for a copy into a userspace buffer either via dmesg or proc/kmsg= interfaces. IMO that's fine - I don't think pointers in the kernel ring buffer should b= e restricted. Instead, access to dmesg / proc/kmsg should be restricted appropriately. I guess it depends on what the goal here is. Do we really want to stop root= from ever seeing a kernel pointer (in which case OOPS messages wouldn't really w= ork anymore)? My view is that restricting these interfaces so far that only roo= t can access them and it's unlikely that root accidentally does so is sufficient. --j+D14l8Ki1YJdzYp Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc" Content-Description: Digital signature -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQIcBAEBAgAGBQJX97FjAAoJED4KNFJOeCOo/b4P/jJUehfAyGe51DqHY1/9/vi6 3c/+ck/Y3uA0WL0WuSM+yI2tBWLXjrlj2Rv+CpPVShHf8NRCgNU8JX514gnFUoA+ 64npld7vKGc29eARudnmm9S/2FblpQQbSCfN8Pwc79Pawe8j/uB6oM+mTVV85NvL F41WzA5LNeVAf7IaPElWae4Tpa6a9NmTaLM0vCQDFMjqyaYgO+twtjzyoDFxWj5/ JylCbdaYoz0qsvLO91ZZMGndarSjXW/1Re8jSFSPvFo8gUj4xA6b1OZEUw5r1oSE uyrG+/mWWFMDOujFNXtLgLZWk0IGF40nm1Ubl92494grl+yiBAXw8DWdXDvQiuLX PKgwzNHtvjrGSPyRP/CM5/Dag8agmeo4+IxtR3HU6Ncq4kSVYDvabskax6SIv23Q NP10mWhrWqTnNU3k5cdvcxOZM+INKacNuFEJJ0lpLdSHp4i/DQFAOQQIsJYgXyku kbrJCJTc2WynG/0LflOTJExWpoPowzhuKHgIJc2/0P9/HV1I0ZNjROZeOa7UKcL2 RpXaEu1t1kvdD2jGYi2Bo7PFBKW8jrsxYM1TK50tV0Su/1DQcNwn/1KSplMKftsd lVel8jOHbjTfvLY516C+4TMvWE1vzdVgDPXo7x7BKjwOD8qZfPeKJ16krvKRu7wU PfUMnqZ54xcsmRNbvy5B =t1aD -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --j+D14l8Ki1YJdzYp--