Return-Path: Received: from zeniv.linux.org.uk ([195.92.253.2]:45878 "EHLO ZenIV.linux.org.uk" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753069AbdBNTAt (ORCPT ); Tue, 14 Feb 2017 14:00:49 -0500 Date: Tue, 14 Feb 2017 19:00:40 +0000 From: Al Viro To: Theodore Ts'o Cc: Anand Jain , linux-fsdevel Subject: Re: fs/crypto: root read-access without key Message-ID: <20170214190040.GB29622@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> References: <8f00a43e-c6eb-265e-f3ca-d306179d61d9@oracle.com> <20170214155023.y3xideahis6xtlgv@thunk.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20170214155023.y3xideahis6xtlgv@thunk.org> Sender: linux-fsdevel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On Tue, Feb 14, 2017 at 10:50:23AM -0500, Theodore Ts'o wrote: > It also isn't complete, since someone could infer whether or not a > file exists, unless we also completely spike out the dcache, which > would be an even worse performance disaster. > > So the current model is that if you want to protect file, the Unix > permissions do have to be set correctly, and root can read everything. > The presense or absense of keys is *not* currently intended to be an > access control mechanism. Not that root couldn't simply take over any process of the user in question and ptrace its way into issuing arbitrary syscalls...