Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2017 20:35:16 -0400 From: Steven Rostedt Message-ID: <20171017203516.3746395e@vmware.local.home> In-Reply-To: <20171017231559.GD8001@eros> References: <1508215972-7769-1-git-send-email-me@tobin.cc> <20171017093119.6dd98919@gandalf.local.home> <20171017231559.GD8001@eros> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v2] printk: hash addresses printed with %p To: "Tobin C. Harding" Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, Linus Torvalds , Kees Cook , Paolo Bonzini , Tycho Andersen , "Roberts, William C" , Tejun Heo , Jordan Glover , Greg KH , Petr Mladek , Joe Perches , Ian Campbell , Sergey Senozhatsky , Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Chris Fries , Dave Weinstein , Daniel Micay , Djalal Harouni , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On Wed, 18 Oct 2017 10:15:59 +1100 "Tobin C. Harding" wrote: > > Does %p[FfSs] leak addresses? Well, I guess it does if they are not > > found in kallsyms, but otherwise you have: > > > > function+0x > > You are correct %pF and %pS print an offset. Does this provide an attack vector, > I didn't think so but I'm no security expert. If they do then we need to amend > those calls also. Hopefully not. We changed stack dumps to use them only instead of showing addresses because of the location leak. -- Steve