Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2018 20:05:32 +0000
From: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Message-ID: <20180117200532.GX13338@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
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Sender: Al Viro <viro@ftp.linux.org.uk>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3 8/9] x86: use __uaccess_begin_nospec and ASM_IFENCE in
 get_user paths
To: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com>, Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>, Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
List-ID: <kernel-hardening.lists.openwall.com>

On Wed, Jan 17, 2018 at 11:54:12AM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 17, 2018 at 10:52 AM, Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> wrote:
> > On Wed, Jan 17, 2018 at 02:17:26PM +0000, Alan Cox wrote:
> [..]
> >         Incidentally, what about copy_to_iter() and friends?  They
> > check iov_iter flavour and go either into the "copy to kernel buffer"
> > or "copy to userland" paths.  Do we need to deal with mispredictions
> > there?  We are calling a bunch of those on read()...
> >
> 
> Those should be protected by the conversion of __uaccess_begin to
> __uaccess_begin_nospec that includes the lfence.

Huh?  What the hell does it do to speculative execution of "memcpy those
suckers" branch?