Date: Tue, 3 Jul 2018 20:19:31 +0200 From: Hanno =?UTF-8?B?QsO2Y2s=?= Subject: Patch for SymlinksIfOwnerMatches Message-ID: <20180703201931.79b546f8@computer.lan> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com List-ID: Hi, There's a nasty problem in many webserver configurations on multiuser systems, I've blogged about it a while ago [1]. With a symlink it's often possible to read out configuration files of other users. This was famously used in the freedom hosting II hack [2]. grsecurity had a workaround for this: By not allowing file operations to follow symlinks if the owner of the link and the target don't match it can block this kind of attack. I saw a need to keep this feature alive in a post-grsecurity world, so a while ago I extracted it from the grsecurity patch. I've now made that public: https://github.com/hannob/symlinkown I'm not sure about upstreaming, I think it's a worthy feature, but it might need some work in polishing it. But for now I'll just share it and I will hopefully be able to keep the patch working for future kernels. [1] https://blog.hboeck.de/archives/873-The-tricky-security-issue-with-FollowSy= mLinks-and-Apache.html [2] https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/55990/deep-web/freedom-hosting-ii-hack= .html --=20 Hanno B=C3=B6ck https://hboeck.de/ mail/jabber: hanno@hboeck.de GPG: FE73757FA60E4E21B937579FA5880072BBB51E42