From: Tom Rini Date: Sat, 17 Nov 2018 09:08:24 -0500 Subject: [U-Boot] [U-Boot, 1/2] image-sig: Ensure that hashed-nodes is null-terminated In-Reply-To: <1541620306-14314-1-git-send-email-trini@konsulko.com> References: <1541620306-14314-1-git-send-email-trini@konsulko.com> Message-ID: <20181117140824.GF11247@bill-the-cat> List-Id: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: u-boot@lists.denx.de On Wed, Nov 07, 2018 at 02:51:45PM -0500, Tom Rini wrote: > From: Konrad Beckmann > > A specially crafted FIT image leads to memory corruption in the stack > when using the verified boot feature. The function fit_config_check_sig > has a logic error that makes it possible to write past the end of the > stack allocated array node_inc. This could potentially be used to bypass > the signature check when using verified boot. > > This change ensures that the number of strings is correct when counted. > > Signed-off-by: Konrad Beckmann > Reviewed-by: Simon Glass Applied to u-boot/master, thanks! -- Tom -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 819 bytes Desc: not available URL: