Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="===============2298362981875501411==" MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Andrew Zaborowski Subject: [PATCH 2/6] tls: Fix length in TLS 1.0 signature verification Date: Fri, 30 Nov 2018 13:05:46 +0100 Message-ID: <20181130120550.8866-2-andrew.zaborowski@intel.com> In-Reply-To: <20181130120550.8866-1-andrew.zaborowski@intel.com> List-Id: To: ell@lists.01.org --===============2298362981875501411== Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Account for the shorter Certificate Verify message in TLS 1.0/1.1 when parsing the message to verify the signature. This fixes server side TLS 1.0/1.1 support which apparently has been broken since the migration to l_key. --- ell/tls.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/ell/tls.c b/ell/tls.c index 73a378c..83128a5 100644 --- a/ell/tls.c +++ b/ell/tls.c @@ -1330,7 +1330,7 @@ static bool tls_rsa_verify(struct l_tls *tls, const u= int8_t *in, size_t len, } = success =3D l_key_verify(tls->peer_pubkey, L_KEY_RSA_PKCS1_V1_5, - hash_type, expected, in + 4, + hash_type, expected, in + offset + 2, expected_len, tls->peer_pubkey_size); = if (!success) -- = 2.19.1 --===============2298362981875501411==--