Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="===============0689831351115663026==" MIME-Version: 1.0 From: Andrew Zaborowski Subject: [PATCH 3/4] tls: DHE_RSA key exchange implementation server side Date: Wed, 09 Jan 2019 11:43:48 +0100 Message-ID: <20190109104349.11763-3-andrew.zaborowski@intel.com> In-Reply-To: <20190109104349.11763-1-andrew.zaborowski@intel.com> List-Id: To: ell@lists.01.org --===============0689831351115663026== Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Add the handler for the ClientKeyExchange message and a builder callback for the ServerKeyExchange message for DHE_RSA. --- ell/tls-suites.c | 187 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 187 insertions(+) diff --git a/ell/tls-suites.c b/ell/tls-suites.c index 14ea470..b9fdc0f 100644 --- a/ell/tls-suites.c +++ b/ell/tls-suites.c @@ -691,6 +691,34 @@ static struct tls_key_exchange_algorithm tls_ecdhe_rsa= =3D { /* Maximum FF DH prime modulus size in bytes */ #define TLS_DHE_MAX_SIZE 1024 = +/* RFC 3526, Section 3 */ +static const uint8_t tls_dh14_prime[] =3D { + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xc9, 0x0f, 0xda, 0xa2, + 0x21, 0x68, 0xc2, 0x34, 0xc4, 0xc6, 0x62, 0x8b, 0x80, 0xdc, 0x1c, 0xd1, + 0x29, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x08, 0x8a, 0x67, 0xcc, 0x74, 0x02, 0x0b, 0xbe, 0xa6, + 0x3b, 0x13, 0x9b, 0x22, 0x51, 0x4a, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8e, 0x34, 0x04, 0xdd, + 0xef, 0x95, 0x19, 0xb3, 0xcd, 0x3a, 0x43, 0x1b, 0x30, 0x2b, 0x0a, 0x6d, + 0xf2, 0x5f, 0x14, 0x37, 0x4f, 0xe1, 0x35, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x51, 0xc2, 0x45, + 0xe4, 0x85, 0xb5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5e, 0x7e, 0xc6, 0xf4, 0x4c, 0x42, 0xe9, + 0xa6, 0x37, 0xed, 0x6b, 0x0b, 0xff, 0x5c, 0xb6, 0xf4, 0x06, 0xb7, 0xed, + 0xee, 0x38, 0x6b, 0xfb, 0x5a, 0x89, 0x9f, 0xa5, 0xae, 0x9f, 0x24, 0x11, + 0x7c, 0x4b, 0x1f, 0xe6, 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xec, 0xe4, 0x5b, 0x3d, + 0xc2, 0x00, 0x7c, 0xb8, 0xa1, 0x63, 0xbf, 0x05, 0x98, 0xda, 0x48, 0x36, + 0x1c, 0x55, 0xd3, 0x9a, 0x69, 0x16, 0x3f, 0xa8, 0xfd, 0x24, 0xcf, 0x5f, + 0x83, 0x65, 0x5d, 0x23, 0xdc, 0xa3, 0xad, 0x96, 0x1c, 0x62, 0xf3, 0x56, + 0x20, 0x85, 0x52, 0xbb, 0x9e, 0xd5, 0x29, 0x07, 0x70, 0x96, 0x96, 0x6d, + 0x67, 0x0c, 0x35, 0x4e, 0x4a, 0xbc, 0x98, 0x04, 0xf1, 0x74, 0x6c, 0x08, + 0xca, 0x18, 0x21, 0x7c, 0x32, 0x90, 0x5e, 0x46, 0x2e, 0x36, 0xce, 0x3b, + 0xe3, 0x9e, 0x77, 0x2c, 0x18, 0x0e, 0x86, 0x03, 0x9b, 0x27, 0x83, 0xa2, + 0xec, 0x07, 0xa2, 0x8f, 0xb5, 0xc5, 0x5d, 0xf0, 0x6f, 0x4c, 0x52, 0xc9, + 0xde, 0x2b, 0xcb, 0xf6, 0x95, 0x58, 0x17, 0x18, 0x39, 0x95, 0x49, 0x7c, + 0xea, 0x95, 0x6a, 0xe5, 0x15, 0xd2, 0x26, 0x18, 0x98, 0xfa, 0x05, 0x10, + 0x15, 0x72, 0x8e, 0x5a, 0x8a, 0xac, 0xaa, 0x68, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, +}; + +static const unsigned int tls_dh14_generator =3D 2; + struct tls_dhe_params { size_t prime_len; struct l_key *prime; @@ -758,6 +786,100 @@ static bool tls_get_server_dh_params_hash(struct l_tl= s *tls, uint8_t tls_id, return true; } = +static bool tls_send_dhe_server_key_xchg(struct l_tls *tls) +{ + uint8_t buf[1024 + TLS_DHE_MAX_SIZE * 3]; + uint8_t *ptr =3D buf + TLS_HANDSHAKE_HEADER_SIZE; + struct tls_dhe_params *params; + const uint8_t *prime_buf; + uint8_t generator_buf =3D tls_dh14_generator; + uint8_t public_buf[TLS_DHE_MAX_SIZE]; + size_t public_len; + unsigned int zeros =3D 0; + ssize_t sign_len; + + params =3D l_new(struct tls_dhe_params, 1); + + /* + * For now hardcode the Oakley Group 14 parameters like some other + * TLS implementations do without RFC 7919, which is actually a + * downside because the more common the group parameters are the + * less secure they are assumed to be, but also is a test that the + * group is sufficiently good. + * + * Eventually we should make this configurable so that a unique + * likely-prime number generated by either 'openssl dhparam' or + * 'ssh-keygen -G' can be set, or parse /etc/ssh/moduli to select + * a random pre-generated FFDH group each time. + */ + prime_buf =3D tls_dh14_prime; + params->prime_len =3D sizeof(tls_dh14_prime); + + params->prime =3D l_key_new(L_KEY_RAW, prime_buf, params->prime_len); + params->generator =3D l_key_new(L_KEY_RAW, &generator_buf, 1); + + if (!params->prime || !params->generator) { + TLS_DISCONNECT(TLS_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR, 0, "l_key_new failed"); + goto free_params; + } + + params->private =3D l_key_generate_dh_private(prime_buf, params->prime_le= n); + if (!params->private) { + TLS_DISCONNECT(TLS_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR, 0, + "l_key_generate_dh_private failed"); + goto free_params; + } + + public_len =3D params->prime_len; + + if (!l_key_compute_dh_public(params->generator, params->private, + params->prime, public_buf, + &public_len)) { + TLS_DISCONNECT(TLS_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR, 0, + "l_key_compute_dh_public failed"); + goto free_params; + } + + while (zeros < public_len && public_buf[zeros] =3D=3D 0x00) + zeros++; + + params->server_dh_params_buf =3D ptr; + + /* RFC 5246, Section 7.4.3 */ + + l_put_be16(params->prime_len, ptr); + memcpy(ptr + 2, prime_buf, params->prime_len); + ptr +=3D 2 + params->prime_len; + + l_put_be16(1, ptr); + memcpy(ptr + 2, &generator_buf, 1); + ptr +=3D 2 + 1; + + l_put_be16(public_len - zeros, ptr); + memcpy(ptr + 2, public_buf + zeros, public_len - zeros); + ptr +=3D 2 + public_len - zeros; + + params->server_dh_params_len =3D ptr - params->server_dh_params_buf; + tls->pending.key_xchg_params =3D params; + + sign_len =3D tls->pending.cipher_suite->key_xchg->sign(tls, ptr, + buf + sizeof(buf) - ptr, + tls_get_server_dh_params_hash); + if (sign_len < 0) + return false; + + ptr +=3D sign_len; + tls_tx_handshake(tls, TLS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, buf, ptr - buf); + return true; + +free_params: + l_key_free(params->prime); + l_key_free(params->generator); + l_key_free(params->private); + l_free(params); + return false; +} + static void tls_handle_dhe_server_key_xchg(struct l_tls *tls, const uint8_t *buf, size_t len) { @@ -937,13 +1059,78 @@ static bool tls_send_dhe_client_key_xchg(struct l_tl= s *tls) return true; } = +static void tls_handle_dhe_client_key_xchg(struct l_tls *tls, + const uint8_t *buf, size_t len) +{ + struct tls_dhe_params *params =3D tls->pending.key_xchg_params; + uint8_t pre_master_secret[params->prime_len]; + size_t pre_master_secret_len; + size_t public_len; + unsigned int zeros =3D 0; + + if (len < 2) + goto decode_error; + + public_len =3D l_get_be16(buf); + buf +=3D 2; + len -=3D 2; + + if (public_len !=3D len) + goto decode_error; + + /* + * RFC 7919 Section 4: + * "the server MUST verify that 1 < dh_Yc < dh_p - 1. If dh_Yc is + * out of range, the server MUST terminate the connection with + * a fatal handshake_failure(40) alert." + */ + if (!l_key_validate_dh_payload(buf, public_len, + tls_dh14_prime, params->prime_len)) { + TLS_DISCONNECT(TLS_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAIL, 0, + "Client DH public value invalid"); + return; + } + + params->public =3D l_key_new(L_KEY_RAW, buf, public_len); + if (!params->prime) { + TLS_DISCONNECT(TLS_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR, 0, "l_key_new failed"); + return; + } + + pre_master_secret_len =3D params->prime_len; + + if (!l_key_compute_dh_secret(params->public, params->private, + params->prime, pre_master_secret, + &pre_master_secret_len)) { + TLS_DISCONNECT(TLS_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR, 0, + "Generating DH shared-secret failed"); + return; + } + + while (zeros < pre_master_secret_len && + pre_master_secret[zeros] =3D=3D 0x00) + zeros++; + + tls_free_dhe_params(tls); + tls_generate_master_secret(tls, pre_master_secret + zeros, + pre_master_secret_len - zeros); + memset(pre_master_secret, 0, pre_master_secret_len); + return; + +decode_error: + TLS_DISCONNECT(TLS_ALERT_DECODE_ERROR, 0, + "ClientKeyExchange decode error"); +} + static struct tls_key_exchange_algorithm tls_dhe_rsa =3D { .id =3D 1, /* RSA_sign */ .certificate_check =3D true, .need_ecc =3D true, .validate_cert_key_type =3D tls_rsa_validate_cert_key, + .send_server_key_exchange =3D tls_send_dhe_server_key_xchg, .handle_server_key_exchange =3D tls_handle_dhe_server_key_xchg, .send_client_key_exchange =3D tls_send_dhe_client_key_xchg, + .handle_client_key_exchange =3D tls_handle_dhe_client_key_xchg, .free_params =3D tls_free_dhe_params, .sign =3D tls_rsa_sign, .verify =3D tls_rsa_verify, -- = 2.19.1 --===============0689831351115663026==--